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5Abstract
The day is not far off when autonomous, artificially intelligent computational 
subjects will be employed in creative industries such as architecture and design. 
Artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming ubiquitous, and it has absorbed many 
capabilities once thought beyond its reach. As such, it is critical that we reflect on 
AI’s ability to design, and on whether we are affording our creative computational 
counterparts the full range of tools and freedoms utilized by designers. 
Design is often tasked with pushing the envelope in the quest for novel meaning 
and experience. Designers can’t always rely upon existing models to judge their 
work. Operating like this requires a curious and open mind, a willingness to 
eschew reward and occasionally break the rules, and a desire to explore for the 
sake of exploring. These behaviors fly in the face of traditional implementations of 
computation, and raise difficult questions about the autonomy and subjectivity 
of artificially intelligent machines. 
This thesis proposes computational play as a field of research covering how and 
why designers roam as freely as they do, what the creative potential is of such 
exploration, and how such techniques might responsibly be implemented in 
computational machines. The work argues that autotelism, defined as internal 
motivation, is an essential aspect of play and outlines how it can be incorporated 
in a computational framework. The thesis also demonstrates a proof-of-concept 
of computational play in the form of an autonomous drawing machine that is 
able to plot a drawing, view the drawing, and make decisions based on what it 
sees, bringing computational vision and computational drawing together into a 
cyclical process that permits the use of autotelic play behavior. 
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Figure 1-1 
Copying the photo: To the left of the vertical white line is the original photo, and to the right is the author’s drawing.
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I wasn’t a very playful child. 
I certainly wasn’t the “creative type,” and I know I never considered myself 
a budding artist (nor, I assume, did my parents). I always favored the more 
technical studies in my early education. Math and physics were particular 
passions - their well-defined formulas and rigid approaches to problem-solving 
satisfied my thirst for a clean, organized understanding of the universe. 
Curiously, I wound up in an art class when I was fourteen, and before long I 
discovered a knack for drawing. But I couldn’t sketch ideas from my head very 
well, or doodle, or even work from what I saw – instead, I preferred to work 
from photographs. I developed a drawing method based on my love of all things 
technical, and right from the start, I sought to create drawings that looked as real 
as possible (Figure 1-1).
First, I’d choose a photo. I typically worked from a single photo, and I always 
preferred candid shots. The staged, airbrushed look of professional portraits 
frustrated me, because I had trouble pinpointing the exact edges and corners in 
the image, which I used to create the sketch. The more detailed information I 
could measure directly from the photo, the better. The next step I called “plotting 
points.” This involved locating definite, visible “points” in the drawing (usually 
at the intersection of two crisp edges), measuring with a ruler how far each point 
was from each edge (its X and Y coordinates, so to speak), and then scaling that 
number to match the size of the drawing. Often, I would scale and reprint the 
photo to be an even multiple of the drawing size, to make the math easier. Only 
once I had enough points plotted would I feel confident enough to “connect 
the dots” into a curve. The outlines I generated described major features of the 
drawing (such as the eyes, mouth, ears, etc.) as well as general tonal areas such 
as highlights and shadows. I was using the plotted points to set up guidelines 
for myself – boundaries to follow during the later stages of the drawing. After 
that was done, I’d fill in the general underlayer of the drawing, setting down the 
background tone that dominated a particular section (think of it as “tone by 
numbers”). Finally, I moved on to the actual details in the drawing, and here I 
really stuck to the photo. If a particular detail was in the photo, I drew it, and if 
it wasn’t, I didn’t. 
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What I didn’t know at the time was that I was adopting a style called photorealism. 
The style isn’t much more complicated than it sounds: Draw (or paint) a picture 
to match the realism of a photo as closely as possible. Applying my patient, 
rigidly defined techniques to the drawing process, I found this style of art 
instantly comfortable. And for a while, it was rewarding. Observers would often 
compliment me on my artistic ability, and I even won several awards for the 
drawings. But over time, a nagging doubt grew in my mind about the process I 
was using. I was beginning to question just how creative my process really was. 
Although I couldn’t quite put words to it then, I think I was confronting the 
notion that merely copying an image was not enough. It demonstrated a level 
of technical mastery, certainly, and there is always an element of creativity in 
working with artistic media, but beyond this my drawings lacked my personal 
voice. Or rather, my voice was there, but it was saying: I am trying to duplicate 
this thing that already exists. I was terrified of adding anything new, preferring 
instead the safe assurance of copying what already existed. I didn’t have anyone 
telling me what to do, or when, or why. Instead of embracing that freedom, I 
stuck to the script, and copied the photo.
To put it another way – I wasn’t playing. It wasn’t until my undergraduate 
architectural education that I really began to cultivate a habit of play. In my 
studio courses, my teachers pushed me to challenge my own preconceived 
ideas. Architectural design demands many of the artistic abilities that gave me 
so much trouble as a child: improvisation, freedom, fearlessness, looseness, 
experimentation, caprice. What it also taught me, however, was the necessary 
role that these behaviors play in the designer’s creative process. 
We ask artists and designers to push the envelope. We grant them the license to 
explore, not just for solutions to a particular problem, but simply for the sake of 
exploring. We do so because we want artists and designers to challenge us – to 
use their creative vision to provoke our understandings and beliefs. We expect 
them to be playful, with even the most serious of topics. Play eschews traditional 
categories and interpretations in favor of new possibility, and it is this ability that 
causes it to be such a useful activity in design. Without the ability to play, design 
loses its true potential as a creative force.
The development of computation, however, has followed a radically different 
approach. Traditionally, our computational models are supplied with 
predetermined notions of right and wrong. These come in various forms, 
from rigid, logical rules to fuzzy, representative data sets. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in artificial intelligence’s recent boom in the form of deep 
learning. In deep learning, AI programs are supplied with vast quantities of 
example items. The programs then use statistical similarity between items to 
construct an understanding of category and type that can be used to interpret 
new information. 
While this approach has proven useful in a variety of complex tasks, it only 
represents a particular approach to decision-making. This approach focuses on 
problem-solving and appeals to the existence of a correct answer. Much like 
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my own tendency to rely upon a photo for confirmation of what was right and 
wrong in my drawing, this reliance upon an existing answer has a tendency to 
limit creative freedom. It short-circuits the creative potential of computation 
before it ever gets going. 
Increasingly, artificial intelligence is expanding into domains never before thought 
possible. The day is not far off when autonomous, intelligent computational 
subjects will be widespread in creative industries such as art and design. As AI 
moves into the realm of design, we must come to terms with a number of difficult 
questions: What does creative freedom really mean for us, and what will it mean 
when it’s granted to artificial intelligence? Are we developing AI to have the same 
range of creative tools and abilities that human designers utilize? Are our current 
approaches to AI adequate for capturing the scope of design thinking? 
In order for autonomous computational machines to succeed at design, we must 
provide them with the ability to play. This vision forms the backbone of my 
research and the basic premise of this thesis. In particular, this thesis argues 
that in order for autonomous computational machines to play, they must be 
autotelic, or internally motivated.
To begin, I review in detail how playfully creative behaviors are demonstrated 
in design; how the development of artificial intelligence has set it along a 
different path; and how the term play is defined in the literature by a variety of 
researchers. In the next part of the thesis, I outline a framework for computational 
play, using the concept of autotelism to frame the discussion and illuminate the 
shortcomings of traditional implementations of artificial intelligence. In part 
four, I present a proof-of-concept implementation of my framework in the form 
of a computational drawing machine. This machine is both a proof-of-concept 
and an object-to-think-with, in that it provides a means for investigating and 
refining what computational play is as well as what it could be. Finally, I conclude 
with a review of how the proposed framework is demonstrated in the machine, 
arguing that it represents one possible method for permitting autonomous 
computational machines to play.
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Figure 2-2 (previous page) 
Author’s manipulation of Figure 2-3.
Figure 2-3 (above) 
Camera lucida drawing machine, c. 1850. 
Original source unknown, retrieved from www.drawingmachines.org.
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Design Problems as Indeterminate
According to design professor Richard Buchanan, design is full of wicked 
problems. Such problems are ill-defined, indeterminate, dynamic, and confusing.1 
Discussing such problems in the context of professional fields, philosopher and 
urban planner Donald Schön describes indeterminate zones of practice as situations 
that “escape the canons of technical rationality.” These zones of practice are 
areas of “uncertainty, uniqueness, and value conflict” that are common across 
all professional fields.2 The problem space of an architectural design, for 
example, is a complex, fluctuating landscape that incorporates often-conflicting 
considerations of aesthetics, culture, structure, and budget, among a myriad of 
other factors. In dealing with such issues, designers explore with limited or no 
knowledge of what the end goal should be, or even if the considerations of today 
will be the same as those of tomorrow. Because of this, the designer must be ever 
on her toes, ready for change. Schön describes the designer’s ability to deal with 
surprise as reflection-in-action, a type of improvisational problem-solving and on-
the-spot experimentation that allows designers to try previously untested ideas.3 
Navigating indeterminate spaces requires the designer to come up with the 
question and provide an answer. Sociologist Richard Sennett reflects on 
a similar scenario at the heart of craftsmanship, stating that the experienced 
craftsman must be able to localize, to question, and to open up a problem.4 Schön 
captures these ideas in his description of problem-framing.5 He also notes that in 
philosopher John Dewey’s view, the designer is “one who converts indeterminate 
situations to determinate ones.”6 All of these depictions involve creating a path 
for inquiry and investigation. This is a back-and-forth investigation of ways 
to ask the question and ways to answer it. As the design progresses, both the 
problem space and the solution space evolve. During this process, the designer 
must remain open to the possibility that the solutions may have an impact on 
the initial question. Knowing that the initial question might change at any 
moment drastically reduces the ability of the designer to rely upon the initial 
question for guidance. Thus, exploring the current space of possibilities is useful 
To create more playful computational designers, we must draw together a dense 
collection of theoretical play literature, design studies, and computational 
frameworks. This part of the thesis will highlight the relevant ideas from each of 
these areas in order to provide the readers with the content necessary to understand 
the proposed framework and implementation. At the end of each chapter, the topic 
will be characterized in light of the literature supplied; these portrayals will allow 
these three rather unwieldy fields to be brought together into one discussion. In 
addition, a diagramming strategy will be introduced that will help to visually capture 
the essence of each topic and carry the discussion into the following parts. 
2.1 Design + Drawing
1. Buchanan, Richard. 1992. 
“Wicked Problems in Design 
Thinking.” 
3. Ibid.
6. Ibid. p. 42
4. Sennett, Richard. 2008. 
The Craftsman.
5. Schön, Donald A. 
1990. Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner.
2. Schön, Donald A. 
1990. Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner: Toward a New 
Design for Teaching and 
Learning in the Professions. 
p. 6
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not just for its potential to solve the problem, but for its potential to shed light 
on the question as well.  
Design as Artistic Creation
At the same time, design is a form of artistic expression. While designers 
have numerous, practical, real-world constraints to attend to, they also share 
in art’s search for novel meaning and experience. Anthropologist Tim Ingold 
describes the creative process as “an ongoing generative movement that is at once 
itinerant, improvisatory, and rhythmic.”7 He highlights the work of artist Paul 
Klee in particular, whose drawing process embodies the kind of curiosity and 
exploration that is central to creativity:
Form, to recall Klee’s words, is death; form-giving is life. I want to argue that 
what Klee said of art is true of skilled practice in general, namely that it is a 
question not of imposing preconceived forms on inert matter but of intervening 
in the fields of force and currents of material wherein forms are generated. 
Practitioners, I contend, are wanderers, wayfarers, whose skill likes in their 
ability to find the grain of the world’s becoming and to follow its course while 
bending it to their evolving purposes. 8
Such behavior is also seen in architectural design. Buildings must satisfy a range 
of technical criteria; we prize them, however, for their ability to transcend these 
utilitarian roles and serve as powerful expressions of personal creative vision.9
This behavior is not easy to maintain. As philosopher Henri Bergson notes, 
the human mind “‘instinctively selects in a given situation whatever is like 
something already known; it seeks this out, in order that it might apply its 
principle that ‘like produces like.’”10 Pressured by the need to satisfy numerous 
constraints, designers must learn to cultivate a set of behaviors that allow their 
7. Ingold, Tim. 2010. “The 
Textility of Making.”  
p. 91
10. Bergson, Henri. 1944. 
Creative Evolution. p. 34.  
As quoted in: 
 Teal, Randall. 2010. 
“Developing a (Non-Linear) 
Practice of Design Thinking.” 
p. 296
8. Ibid. p. 92
9. Schön, Donald A. 
1990. Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner.
Figure 2-4  
Paul Klee, miscellaneous sketches. Klee writes, “the principal and active line develops 
freely. It goes out for a walk, so to speak, aimlessly for the sake of the walk.”  
Image adapted from Klee, Paul. 1961. Paul Klee Notebooks. p. 105
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artistic interests to survive. Designers must remain open-minded and curious. 
Psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi captures this difficulty by highlighting 
ten pairs of juxtaposing traits that a creative individual must maintain. The 
second pair on this list is the need to be both smart and naïve at the same time. 
Without the open-mindedness that comes from naivety, Csikszentmihalyi 
argues, the creative individual may never have any motivation to “question, 
doubt, and improve on existing knowledge.”11
Drawing as a Medium for Design Exploration
Navigating such a complicated terrain is a challenging task. The primary vessel 
for design exploration (in architecture, as well as other fields) is drawing. 
Drawing serves as a powerful method of inquiry, allowing the designer to realize 
even the most complex or abstract concept with relative ease. Drawing enables 
designers to offload and test their ideas, shifting their focus from one part of a 
design to another.12 This can be a useful tool in complex scenarios, as drawing 
allows designers to study a concept visually, rather than cognitively. 
As technology has progressed, so too have the designer’s drawing tools. 
Increasingly, digital tools have come to replace analog ones, as the field of 
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) has grown from its inception in the 1960s.13 
Drawing tools have served as augmenting devices for the designer, occasionally 
developing to the point that entire drawing processes could be subsumed in 
the tool. For instance, the development of digital drafting systems, dating 
back to Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad (Figure 2-6), has resulted in the wholesale 
disappearance of their analog predecessors (Figure 2-5).14
11. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. 
2013. Creativity: The Psychology 
of Discovery and Invention. 
p. 60
12. Suwa, Masaki, and Barbara 
Tversky. 2002. “External 
Representations Contribute to 
the Dynamic Construction of 
Ideas.”
13. Coons, Steven Anson. 
1963. “An Outline of the 
Requirements for a Computer-
Aided Design System.”
14. Sutherland, Ivan. 1975. 
“Structure in Drawings.”
Figure 2-5  
Vertical drafting board with parallel bar 
and drawing tools. Originally published in 
the Norwegian technical journal Teknisk 
Ukeblad in 1893; now in public domain.
Figure 2-6  
Ivan Sutherland operating Sketchpad.  
Image from Sutherland, Ivan. 1975. “Structure in Drawings.”
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More recently, digital drawing programs have begun to incorporate larger 
portions of the design process, expanding to handle everything from 3D 
volumes and building metadata to concept studies and parameterized designs. 
While most designers utilize a combination of programs throughout the life of 
a project, there are still efforts by companies to provide the ultimate drawing 
software: a digital environment that enables the designer to move fluidly from 
initial concept sketch to final production drawings.  
It would be overly simplistic, however, to arrange these developments as a simple 
linear evolution of the medium. Each new technology may afford a vast new 
set of capabilities, but rarely are the older tools completely replaced. Analog 
drafting may have largely disappeared, but the humble pen-on-paper sketch 
still occupies a prime spot in the designer’s studio. Sketching is fast and, with 
practice, borderline effortless. The sketch is an intentionally quick, loose effort 
to visualize an idea. Labor over it for too long, and the sketch becomes a full-
fledged drawing, wearing undesirable grooves into the mind of the designer. 
With Sketchpad, Sutherland highlighted the usefulness of the digital drawing’s 
inherent geometrical structure. He compared this to the unstructured “dirty 
marks on paper” made by the analog draftsman.15 It is perhaps just such a 
lack of structure that has proven to be invaluable to the fast-paced, creative 
environment of design. The fact that sketching is still central to design indicates 
that a drawing’s true value is not always in its accuracy of representation, but in 
its ability to be reinterpreted. Drawing enables the designer to shed the weight 
of an idea such that he or she might shoulder a new concept; in fact, designers 
sometimes draw in order to see new things. Drawings are “not merely a static 
medium for externalizing internal visions, but rather a physical environment 
from which ideas are generated on the fly.” 16
Shape Grammars
Computation theorists George Stiny and James Gips capture many of these ideas 
in their formulation of shape grammars.17 In shape grammars, visual drawing 
rules are used to perform calculations on shapes. These rules can be additive, 
subtractive, transformative – anything that can be drawn. The rules supply some 
kind of shape or set of shapes to be recognized (on the left-hand side), and a 
resulting shape or set of shapes to be drawn (on the right-hand side). In the case 
of the diagram below (Figure 2-7), the rule involves rotating a triangle around 
its centroid, indicated by the light grey cross. 
15. Sutherland, Ivan. 1975. 
“Structure in Drawings.” p. 75
17. Stiny, George, and 
James Gips. 1972. “Shape 
Grammars and the Generative 
Specification of Painting and 
Sculpture.” 
16. Suwa, Masaki, and Barbara 
Tversky. 2002. “External 
Representations Contribute to 
the Dynamic Construction of 
Ideas.” p. 342
Figure 2-7  
Applying a rule in shape grammars. The left shape indicates what must be identified for 
the rule to take place, and the right shape indicates the result of the rule application. 
Adapted from Stiny, George. 2006. Shape: Talking About Seeing and Doing. p. 296.
rule application:
“rotate a triangle 180 degrees around its centroid”
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Multiple rules can then be strung together into a computation. Each step in the 
computation, indicated by a double arrow, involves the application of a chosen 
rule, indicated by a single arrow (Figure 2-8).  
Stiny describes design drawing as an iterative, calculating process of open-ended 
discovery.18 It is up to the designer to decide when and where to apply the rule. 
Within this process, we identify and embed content into what we see as a part 
of our drawing calculation. Once the drawing step is complete, the content fuses 
and loses any of its previous definitions – leaving us to see it anew.19 
This process can seem strange at first. Why intentionally ignore the steps it took 
to get where we are? The reason stems from shape grammars’ appeal to novelty: 
Each new step brings with it a multitude of new content, some of which the 
shape grammarist may never have predicted. Stiny draws together a number of 
descriptions for this phenomenon from a variety of artists, linguists, theorists, 
and philosophers, calling it:
How we acknowledge and process this content is critical to our design process. 
Shape grammars welcome such content, actively encouraging the kind of sudden 
insight that is so critical to design. In so doing, shape grammars reverses the 
typical relationship between description and calculation: Instead of calculating 
with content that has already been described, the shape grammarist (visually) 
calculates first, and then provides a description as a result of the calculation. The 
description of what’s on the page takes a back seat to the process of discovery that 
occurs during design.21 Dethroning the description in such a way allows – in fact, 
encourages – multiple descriptions of the same content. 
ambiguity, emergence, epiphany, eureka (aha) moments, figuration, 
flexible purposing, impression, intuition, invention, irony,  
negative capability, new perception, privileged moments,  
re-description, strong imagination, vitality - strange surprises 20
18. Stiny, George. 2011. 
“What Rule(s) Should I Use?” 
19. Stiny, George. 2006. 
Shape: Talking About Seeing and 
Doing.
21. Stiny, George. 2015. 
“The Critic as Artist: Oscar 
Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape 
Grammars.” 
20. Adapted from lecture slide. 
Stiny, George. “Introductory 
Presentation.” Intro to Shape 
Grammars II. MIT, Cambridge, 
MA. February 27, 2017. Class 
lecture.
Figure 2-8  
Stringing rules together into a computation.  
Adapted from Stiny, George. 2006. Shape: Talking About Seeing and Doing. p. 296.
rule application:
“rotate a triangle 180 degrees around its centroid”
a single step in the computation
shape 1 shape 2
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1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
For example, consider the following shape grammar computation (Figure 2-9). 
The only rule being used is the one mentioned earlier: Any equilateral triangle 
can be rotated 180 degrees about its centroid (Figure 2-7). In each step, the 
vivid red outline indicates the shape that is chosen for rule application, and 
the light pink outline indicates the result of the previous step’s transformation. 
The initial shape is three equilateral triangles. Each points down, and all three 
sharing a common vertex. If we immediately imagine the possibilities for this 
setup, they seem few: There are only three triangles here, and no matter how 
many times we rotate each one individually, nothing seems to change. 
Figure 2-9  
Encountering emergent information in a computation. The red outline indicates 
the content that has been identified for rule application; the pink outline 
indicates the result of the rule application. Adapted from Stiny, George. 2006. 
Shape: Talking About Seeing and Doing. p. 296.
That is, until several steps in. After rotating each triangle once [1-3], we suddenly 
notice that a larger triangle has shown up, made up of the outer edges of the 
triangles combined together [4]. When we apply the rule to this shape, we are 
left with only two triangles - contrary to our initial understanding of what was 
on the page [5]. 
Continuing the rest of the way through this computation, we arrive at a result  [9]
that seems similar to our start point [1], but in fact is very different. Comparing 
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these two states more closely, we see that the triangles are in completely different 
positions. Our rotation rule cannot transform the content from one state into 
the other. It’s only by actively performing the computation and allowing our 
initial definition of the content to completely change that we can realize this 
result. The application of the rule did not limit us, but rather allowed us to 
discover something new. In doing so, we reinterpreted our original conception 
of how the rule could be applied. As mathematician Lionel March puts it, “a 
rule is no fetter…on the contrary, shape rules liberate...Freedom comes from 
following the rule. Bucking a rule is simply to follow another.” 22
Characterizing Design
Design, then, sounds quite different than traditional problem-solving. Indeed, 
Schön criticizes computer scientist Herbert Simon’s description of design 
as “instrumental problem solving: in its best and purest form, a process of 
optimization.” In contrast, Schön describes design as “a kind of making.”23 
He states that: 
...designers construct and impose a coherence of their own. Subsequently they 
discover consequences and implications of their constructions - some unintended 
- which they appreciate and evaluate…Their designing is a web of project 
moves and discovered consequences and implications, sometimes leading 
to reconstruction of the initial coherence - a reflective conversation with the 
materials of a situation.24
This process of seeing and moving in design pairs well with Stiny’s description of 
embedding and fusion in shape grammars. Both insist on design as an ongoing, 
cyclical construction of meaning. 
Ingold also uses the term making. He describes it as a kind of creative 
improvisation, noting that “to improvise is to follow the ways of the world, 
as they open up, rather than to recover a chain of connections, from an end-
point to a starting-point, on a route already travelled.” 25 In a recent issue of 
Design Studies dedicated to this topic, professor of design and computation 
Terry Knight and co-editor Theodora Vardouli define making as “a process that 
fuse
move
embed
see
Figure 2-10  
Comparing Stiny’s embed-fuse cycle in shape grammars  
with Schön’s see-move conversation in design.
22. March, Lionel. 1996. 
“Rulebound Unruliness.” 
p. 398
24. Schön, Donald A. 
1990. Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner. p. 42
25. Ingold, Tim. 2010. “The 
Textility of Making.”  p. 97
23. Schön, Donald A. 
1990. Educating the Reflective 
Practitioner. p. 41
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is time-based (unfolding in real-time, in-the-moment), dynamic (changing), 
improvisational (dealing with uncertainty, ambiguity, and emergence), contingent 
(subject to chance and the unique), situated (within a social,  cultural, physical 
environment), and embodied (engaging the (maker’s) active body and sensori-
motor capabilities).” 26
Characterized this way, design is an iterative, meandering search for interesting 
questions and possible values in an ambiguous and dynamic space of possibilities. 
Designers make their own way through this indeterminate space, often with 
very little guidance, using drawing as a medium for exploration. Designers push 
the boundary, proposing solutions that don’t necessarily fit in to existing models 
or match current understandings. While there are many skills that must be 
refined in order to become adept at creating good design, one of the first steps 
is learning how to cultivate and maintain a healthy curiosity – a willingness to 
explore, and make meaning where none existed before. 
26. Knight, Terry, and 
Theodora Vardouli. 2015. 
“Computational Making.” p. 2
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Computation is broadly defined in this thesis as such:
This definition is intentionally broad, but the key components to note are that:
•	  an action is being performed,
•	 such an action results in a change in the object or environment at hand from 
one state to another, and
•	 each of these elements – the states and the actions – are able to be  discretized.
Each of these components can be seen in Figure 2-11. This pairs well with 
the shape grammar rule application diagrammed earlier (Figure 2-8): The 
computational actions correspond to the rules of shape grammars, and the states 
correspond to the shapes.
While the history of computation predates the digital devices that dominate the 
field today (Euclid’s algorithm for finding the greatest common divisor of two 
numbers was developed in 300 BC), it is the relatively recent implementations 
of computation that will be the focus of this chapter. In particular, the research 
will focus on the development of artificial intelligence, as this effort is a major 
focus of computational research and is closely tied to the equally impressive 
effort to understand human behavior and intelligence.  
Computation is the set of discrete actions 
that bring about changes in state.
2.2 Computation + AI
Figure 2-11  
State change as a simple representation of computation. The diagram bears a strong 
(and non-coincidental) resemblance to rule application in shape grammars.
action:
“add 20% tint to shape”
a single step in the computation
state 1 state 2
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Categorizing AI
In their exhaustive review of the field, computer scientists Stuart Russell and 
Peter Norvig categorize artificial intelligence into four approaches: Thinking 
Humanly, Thinking Rationally, Acting Humanly, and Acting Rationally (Figure 
2-12). The authors also describe the categorical differences between weak AI, 
which attempts to simulate the appearance of human-level intelligence, and 
strong AI, which attempts to create an actual true-to-form implementation of 
intelligent thought.27 Applying these two categories to the initial diagram, the 
rows of strong (thinking) and weak (acting) become two dominant fields of AI, a 
split evidenced by the continued debate over which is a more appropriate pursuit. 
For this research, however, I would like to compare the opposite two 
categorizations: the columns of thinking and acting humanly versus thinking and 
acting rationally. These two approaches are interwoven throughout the history 
of AI, each with its share of success and failure, although a broad generalization 
locates the human-modeled systems in the first few decades of research, with the 
rational approaches occupying more recent efforts. 
A Brief History
While the earliest research into machine intelligence has its roots in the work of 
Turing, Church, and others in the 1930s and 40s, the term artificial intelligence 
was officially coined in 1955, in a proposal for a “summer research project” 
to be conducted at Dartmouth the following year. This conference, which 
featured such computer science pioneers as John McCarthy, Claude Shannon, 
Marvin Minsky, Herbert Simon, and Alan Newell, centered on the idea that a 
machine might mimic the human mind, tackling subjects such as “how to make 
machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems 
now reserved for humans, and improve themselves.”28 From the beginning, this 
research stipulated a goal of simulating human-level of intelligence, rather than 
truly reproducing it, and it began by simulating how the human mind might 
logically reason through a problem.
thinking
acting
rationhuman
THINKING 
HUMANLY
THINKING 
RATIONALLY
ACTING 
HUMANLY
ACTING 
RATIONALLY
Figure 2-12  
Russell and Norvig’s four categories of AI research. Adapted from Russell, Stuart J., 
and Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. p. 2.
27. Russell, Stuart J., and 
Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial 
Intelligence: A Modern 
Approach.
28. McCarthy, John, 
Marvin L. Minsky, Nathaniel 
Rochester, and Claude E. 
Shannon. 2006. “A Proposal 
for the Dartmouth Summer 
Research Project on Artificial 
Intelligence, August 31, 1955.” 
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The efforts of the 50’s and 60’s focused on axioms and logical systems, 
optimistically believing that an elementary set of rules might be enough for an 
artificially intelligent subject to tackle the majority of problems it would face in 
the world. More complex problems, it was argued, simply required a scaling up 
of the hardware (as opposed to more complex software). Newell, Simon, and 
Shaw’s Logic Theorist (1957) and General Problem Solver (1961) are examples of 
general purpose search mechanisms that use reasoning to approach problems the 
same way a human might.29
Soon, researchers realized that the information needed to properly reason in the 
world proved far too large for their initial, general-purpose approaches. Rule 
systems based on human behavior were not abandoned, however. Instead of 
small rule sets being used to solve large numbers of problems, the effort was 
reversed, as large rule sets were employed in singular arenas to solve very particular 
problems. These were the expert systems of the 70’s, and they acknowledged the 
role that  contextual knowledge plays alongside reasoning. The success of these 
implementations was also their weakness, however, as the extreme specificity 
needed to accurately model human-level ability rendered the systems unable to 
be generalized outside of a particular domain.30
Starting in the 80’s, artificial intelligence took a turn away from modeling human 
behavior and toward more objective, rational methods. Neural networks, largely 
dormant since Minsky and Papert’s 1969 book detailing the roadblocks that faced 
the simple networks of the time, made a return. The discovery of back-propagation 
and the use of more complex, multilayer networks (Figure 2-14) easily overcame 
the limitations of early networks (Figure 2-13), and neural networks have remained 
a vital part of AI research ever since. In addition to this, artificial intelligence had 
“finally come firmly under the scientific method.” 31
Figure 2: An illustration of the architecture of our CNN, explicitly showing the delineation of responsibilities
between the two GPUs. One GPU runs the layer-parts at the top of the figure while the other runs the layer-parts
at the bottom. The GPUs communicate only at certain layers. The network’s input is 150,528-dimensional, and
the number of neurons in the network’s remaining layers is given by 253,440–186,624–64,896–64,896–43,264–
4096–4096–1000.
neurons in a kernel map). The second convolutional layer takes as input the (response-normalized
and pooled) output of the first convolutional layer and filters it with 256 kernels of size 5× 5× 48.
The third, fourth, and fifth convolutional layers are connected to one another without any intervening
pooling or normalization layers. The third convolutional layer has 384 kernels of size 3 × 3 ×
256 connected to the (normalized, pooled) outputs of the second convolutional layer. The fourth
convolutional layer has 384 kernels of size 3 × 3 × 192 , and the fifth convolutional layer has 256
kernels of size 3× 3× 192. The fully-connected layers have 4096 neurons each.
4 Reducing Overfitting
Our neural network architecture has 60 million parameters. Although the 1000 classes of ILSVRC
make each training example impose 10 bits of constraint on the mapping from image to label, this
turns out to be insufficient to learn so many parameters without considerable overfitting. Below, we
describe the two primary ways in which we combat overfitting.
4.1 Data Augmentation
The easiest and most common method to reduce overfitting on image data is to artificially enlarge
the dataset using label-preserving transformations (e.g., [25, 4, 5]). We employ two distinct forms
of data augmentation, both of which allow transformed images to be produced from the original
images with very little computation, so the transformed images do not need to be stored on disk.
In our implementation, the transformed images are generated in Python code on the CPU while the
GPU is training on the previous batch of images. So these data augmentation schemes are, in effect,
computationally free.
The first form of data augmentation consists of generating image translations and horizontal reflec-
tions. We do this by extracting random 224× 224 patches (and their horizontal reflections) from the
256×256 images and training our network on these extracted patches4. This increases the size of our
training set by a factor of 2048, though the resulting training examples are, of course, highly inter-
dependent. Without this scheme, our network suffers from substantial overfitting, which would have
forced us to use much smaller networks. At test time, the network makes a prediction by extracting
five 224 × 224 patches (the four corner patches and the center patch) as well as their horizontal
reflections (hence ten patches in all), and averaging the predictions made by the network’s softmax
layer on the ten patches.
The second form of data augmentation consists of altering the intensities of the RGB channels in
training images. Specifically, we perform PCA on the set of RGB pixel values throughout the
ImageNet training set. To each training image, we add multiples of the found principal components,
4This is the reason why the input images in Figure 2 are 224× 224× 3-dimensional.
5
730 Chapter 18. Learning from Examples
The first thing to notice is that a perceptron network with m outputs is reallym separate
networks, because each weight affects only one of the outputs. Thus, there will be m sepa-
rate training processes. Furthermore, depending on the typ of activation function used, the
training processes will be either the perceptron learning rule (Equation (18.7) on page 724)
or gradient descent rule for the logistic regression (Equation (18.8) on page 727).
If you try either method on the two-bit-adder data, something interesting happens. Unit
3 learns the carry function easily, but unit 4 completely fails to learn the sum function. No,
unit 4 is not defective! The problem is with the sum function itself. We saw in Section 18.6
that linear classifiers (whether hard or soft) can represent linear decision boundaries in the in-
put space. This works fine for the carry function, which is a logical AND (see Figure 18.21( )).
The sum function, however, is an XOR (exclusive OR) of the two inputs. As Figure 18.21(c)
illustrates, this function is not linearly separable so the perceptron cannot learn it.
The linearly separable functions constitute just a small fraction of all Boolean func-
tions; Exercise 18.20 sks you to quantify this fraction. The inability of perceptrons to learn
even such simple functions as XOR was a significant setback to the nascent neural network
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(b)(a)
Figure 18.20 (a) A perceptron network with two inputs and two output units. (b) A neural
network with two inputs, one hidden layer of two units, and one output unit. Not shown are
the dummy inputs and their associated weights.
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Figure 18.21 Linear separability in threshold perceptrons. Black dots indicate a point in
the input space where the value of the function is 1, and white dots indicate a point where the
value is 0. The perceptron returns 1 on the region on the non-shaded side of the line. In (c),
no such line exists that corre tly classifi s the inputs.
Figure 2-13  
Early neural networks (the left etwor  is kn wn as a perceptron) only had a couple 
of layers and were drastically limited in ability. Image from Russell, Stuart J., and Peter 
Norvig. 2010. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. p. 730.
Figu  2-14  
An example of a recently-developed neural network - massively more complex than the 
early attempts. Image from Krizhevsky, Alex, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. 
2012. “ImageNet Classification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks.” p. 5.
29. Russell, Stuart J., and 
Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial 
Intelligence. p. 17-18
31. Russell, Stuart J., and 
Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial 
Intelligence. p. 25
30. Forsythe, Diana. 2001. 
Studying Those Who Study Us: 
An Anthropologist in the World 
of Artificial Intelligence. 
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Coming under the scientific method enabled AI to more easily adopt techniques 
from other fields (and be employed by them). AI also began to absorb more 
probabilistic-based methods of computation, such as fuzzy logic and Bayesian 
networks.32 And finally, in the past 10-15 years, AI has capitalized on the boom in 
massive data sets. Big data has resulted in a drastic increase in the performance of 
many AI systems, most notably neural networks, with the resulting deep learning 
models matching or even surpassing human performance (Figure 2-15).33
Figure 2-16  
Computation, and specifically AI, has consistently shown a tendency to rely on 
external, pre-existing sources for guidance and verification. In the diagram above, the 
computation references the dark square for guidance at each step.
Figure 4: (Left) Eight ILSVRC-2010 test images and the five labels considered most probable by our model.
The correct label is written under each image, and the probability assigned to the correct label is also shown
with a red bar (if it happens to be in the top 5). (Right) Five ILSVRC-2010 test images in the first column. The
remaining columns show the six training images that produce feature vectors in the last hidden layer with the
smallest Euclidean distance from the feature vector for the test image.
In the left panel of Figure 4 we qualitatively assess what the network has learned by computing its
top-5 predictions on eight test images. Notice that even off-center objects, such as the mite in the
top-left, can be recognized by the net. Most of the top-5 labels appear reasonable. For example,
only other types of cat are considered plausible labels for the leopard. In some cases (grille, cherry)
the e is ge uin ambiguity ab ut e intended focus of the photograph.
Another way to probe the network’s visual knowledge is to consider the feature activations induced
by an image at the last, 4096-dimensional hidden layer. If two images produce feature activation
vectors with a small Euclidean separation, we can say that the higher levels of the neural network
consider them to be similar. Figure 4 shows five images from the test set and the six images from
the training set that are most similar to each of them according to this measure. Notice that at the
pixel level, the retrieved training images are generally not close in L2 to the query images in the first
column. For example, the retrieved dogs and elephants appear in a variety of poses. We present the
results for many more test images in the supplementary material.
Computing similarity by using Euclidean distance between two 4096-dimensional, real-valued vec-
tors is inefficient, but it could be made efficient by training an auto-encoder to compress these vectors
to short binary codes. This should produce a much better image retrieval method than applying auto-
encoders to the raw pixels [14], which does not make use of image labels and hence has a tendency
to retrieve images with similar patterns of edges, whether or not they are semantically similar.
7 Discussion
Our results show that a large, deep convolutional neural network is capable of achieving record-
breaking results on a highly challenging dataset using purely supervised learning. It is notable
that our network’s performance degrades if a single convolutional layer is removed. For example,
removing any of the middle layers results in a loss of about 2% for the top-1 performance of the
network. So the depth really is important for achieving our results.
To simplify our experiments, we did not use any unsupervised pre-training even though we expect
that it will help, especially if we obtain enough computational power to significantly increase the
size of the network without obtaining a corresponding increase in the amount of labeled data. Thus
far, our results have improved as we have made our network larger and trained it longer but we still
have many orders of magnitude to go in order to match the infero-temporal pathway of the human
visual system. Ultimately we would like to use very large and deep convolutional nets on video
sequences where the temporal structure provides very helpful information that is missing or far less
obvious in static images.
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Figure 2-15 
Modern neural networks are becoming increasingly excellent at recognizing images. 
Image from Krizhevsky, Alex, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. 2012. 
“ImageNet Classification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks.”
32. Russell, Stuart J., and 
Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial 
Intelligence.
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Peter Norvig. 2010. Artificial 
Intelligence.
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Characterizing the Difference
It is not hard to understand why this turn from modeling human behavior to 
modeling rational behavior took place. As Russell and Norvig point out, the rational 
approach is more well-defined, more scientific, and more amenable to other domains. 
As such, it can draw on long-established knowledge (the field of cognitive science, 
on the other hand, is as young as AI). Historically, AI has focused on topics such as 
learning, reasoning, planning, communication, and real-world interaction. These 
problem-solving topics all benefit from an appeal to rationality.34
Another way to view this transition is from modeling the subjective to modeling 
the objective. AI started with a focus on explicitly representing human behavior 
and consequently struggled with all of the idiosyncrasies that come with it. Over 
time, the model f the human has been substituted with that of  rational, 
objective ideal. In part, this explains the rise of deep learning: The configuration 
of neural networks increasingly requires less and less input or supervision from a 
human programmer. Grounded in millions of examples, the behavior of neural 
networks appear to exhibit some kind of objective truth. 
332 Background
2.3 Play
Play: The term brings to a mind a variety of different activities. Maybe we 
think first of the play of children, then a play in a theater, perhaps finally 
landing on the inanimate play of light on the water, or wind in the trees. 
Play, like intelligence or creativity, is what Marvin Minksy might have dubbed 
a suitcase word, an idea so broad and vague that any number of definitions 
and conceptions can be stuffed inside.35 It should come as no surprise that 
the topic of play has been studied by a variety of researchers across a range of 
different eras, often with quite different outcomes. 
For the purposes of this research, several clarifications will help to focus the 
discussion. First, only solitary play will be discussed – social play, involving more 
than one subject, will not be included. Second, it will be helpful for the readers 
to detach play from the topic of games. While play can certainly take place 
in game scenarios, such behavior has many dynamics that are not relevant to 
this research. The remaining topic – play investigated as a matter of personal 
curiosity – is the play that shows up in creativity and design, and which we have 
yet to properly develop in our computational models of artificial intelligence. 
Next, it will help to categorize the research in some way. Similar to Russell and 
Norvig’s two-dimensional categorization of AI research (Figure 2-12), play 
research can be studied with two lenses in mind. The first is to consider whether 
the author is discussing the subject (the player) or the activity (the play). The 
second is to ask whether the author is observing play and empirically relating its 
qualities (the corollary of weak AI) or inferring what is happening behind the 
scenes (strong AI). With these two lenses, we generate four categories of play 
research: Some authors study observable qualities, describing the behavior of 
the typical player or the notable attributes of the play activity. Meanwhile, 
others attempt to peek behind the curtain, discussing the unobservable 
intentions of the player or inferring what they believe to be the true value of 
play (Figure 2-17).
Characterizing the Similarity
The distinction between human and rational models indicates an interesting 
shift in belief about what the source of AI’s knowledge should be. However, it is 
still relevant to note that in both cases, there is always a source. In other words, 
both human and rational models provide the artificially intelligent subjects 
with pre-existing knowledge (Figure 2-16). This started with hard-coded laws 
of human behavior and has transitioned to statistical aggregations of objective 
examples. Sometimes the behavior is neat, and other times it’s fuzzy; sometimes 
it is deceptively simple, other times it is impenetrably complex; but with AI 
constantly framed as a problem-solving strategy, there is always an existing 
model of right and wrong. 
35. Minsky, Marvin. 2007. The 
Emotion Machine: Commonsense 
Thinking, Artificial Intelligence 
and the Future of the Human 
Mind.
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These provide useful categories for initial analysis. While these categories are 
not perfect and do contain some overlap, they nonetheless help to structure a 
discussion about the existing research. Another way to consider these categories 
is to ask:
•	 BEHAVIORS: What do players do?
•	 ATTRIBUTES: What does play look like?
•	 INTENTIONS: Why do players play?
•	 VALUE: What is the purpose of play?
Characterizing Play
BEHAVIORS: What do players do?
Players engages in iterative, nonlinear, exploratory behavior.36 The player actively 
tests and pushes against the particular set of rules or restrictions that make up 
her play space, occasionally adjusting the rules to change the play.37 The player 
sometimes moves spontaneously, improvising a step without knowing what 
will happen.38 Through it all, the player demonstrates curiosity, often exploring 
options simply to see what will happen.39 Upon entering the play space, whether 
it’s a totally new space or just newly altered, the player commences exploring all 
of its corners and possibilities.40  
ATTRIBUTES: What does play look like?
Play is governed by rules. These rules act as either restrictions or allowances, 
defining the type of activity that will be allowed during the play. Players can 
heed the rules or decide to break or change them, but each action is committed 
in direct response to the rules.41 The rules form the playground, or setting, for the 
play. Dutch historian and early play theorist Johan Huizinga refers to this as the 
magic circle of play.42 This space is temporary, delimited in both space and time.43
observable
inferred
playplayer
BEHAVIOR ATTRIBUTES
INTENTIONS VALUE
Figure 2-17  
Four categories of play research.  
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Within this space, play is entirely immersive. The playground is the player’s 
reality; the typical rules of everyday life have been substituted for the rules of the 
play. This makes it unreal in the sense that the rules offer an alternative to the rules 
of reality.44, 45 The rules of the play might borrow heavily from the rules of reality, 
tweaking just one or two, but even a single change involves the demarcation of a 
new playground. The resulting strict separation from reality frees the player from 
external constraint, making possible the exploratory, internally-driven behavior 
mentioned previously. As a result, play often seems to be an irrational activity, 
although that is largely because the frame of reference of that judgment is not 
considering the rules that govern the player’s reality. 
INTENTIONS: Why do players play?
The player can play for a variety of reasons – to escape reality,46 to cope with 
ambiguity,47 or even to satisfy some external objective. Much play is pleasurable, 
though it needn’t be. Additionally, much of the pleasure in play lies not in its 
outcome, but in its engagement: in setting up rules and seeking new possibilities, 
in engaging alternate realities, and in suspending rational constraints.48 If there 
is a developmental or learning aspect to play, it occurs as a result of play, rather 
than as an impetus to play.
Most importantly, players play because they want to. Psychologist Jerome Bruner 
describes this quality as the player’s inner-directedness.49 In order to exhibit this 
quality, subjects must possess no fear of punishment. The immersive quality of 
play enables this: Freed from external judgment, the player is able to explore any 
and all solutions at his or her discretion, knowing that in the alternate reality of 
play, the normal consequences do not apply. 
VALUE: What is the purpose of play?
Here the research on play is the most divided. Many argue for play’s educational 
or societal value, but the position of this research is that play is conducted for 
play’s sake, and nothing more.50, 51, 52, 53  Gadamer notes that play exhibits a 
tendency for self-renewal, indicating that play is entirely self-fulfilling.54 Hilde 
Hein summarizes it best: “to value [play] for its possible consequences is a denial 
of its essence.” 55
Consequently, play cannot be connected to external expectations. While it may 
prove useful to a host of cultural, social, and developmental functions, these 
results rely on play for their explanation, and not the reverse. This quality – 
known as play’s autotelism – will be explored in more detail in the next part of 
the thesis, as it is autotelism that lends play its true potential as a creative force.
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Diagramming Play
As a way to carry this portrayal of play throughout the thesis, consider the 
following diagram (Figure 2-18). Here, Huizinga’s magic circle becomes an 
actual boundary: The rules of the play that comprise the playground here form 
the perimeter of the play space. Within this space lie all of the possible options 
that the rules of the play allow. The player explores inside this boundary, 
moving freely about in any direction. Again, the immersive nature of play 
means that for all intents and purposes, the circle is the player’s universe. The 
ends of this exploratory path represent the start and end states of the play, 
between which much might change.   
Figure 2-18  
The circle (or rather, oval) of play. The rules form the boundary that defines what is possible 
within the play setting. The play involves some kind of activity occuring along a winding, 
exploratory path, bewteen a start state and an end state. 
possibility space 
defined by 
the rules of play
path of 
exploration
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state
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Computational Creativity
In a paper reviewing the claims of leading creativity researcher Margaret Boden, 
Geraint Wiggins claims that computational creativity is easily within reach:
Therefore, we argue, it is perfectly possible for an exploratorily creative system to 
generate real novelty (because it can produce results which are unpredictable) 
and in some circumstances for those results to be valued, even if it works by brute 
enumeration, and for the system to be capable of judging the value of the artefact 
for itself. These are the criteria for “creativity” in humans—why, objectively, 
should machine creativity be different? 56
With this, Wiggins echoes Boden’s claim that creativity isn’t some kind of special 
capability unique to humans, a stance that has been fiercely contested ever since 
computational creativity was first introduced. 
Computational creativity (in its modern form of digital-computers-making-
art) dates back to 1973, with Harold Cohen’s art program AARON. This 
program uses hard-coded styles provided by Cohen, although the range and 
variation of possible paintings is vast. AARON’s work, which has progressed 
through a variety of artistic styles, has been exhibited in galleries all over the 
world (Figure 2-19).  
2.4 Related Work
Figure 2-19  
Paintings by the computer program AARON: [1] Aaron, with Decorative Panel (1992); 
[2] 040502 (2004);  [3] From Here to There (2011). 
Images from http://www.aaronshome.com/aaron/aaron/index.html.
1 2
3
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Others have followed in Cohen’s and AARON’s footsteps. In 2001, Simon 
Colton developed The Painting Fool, an artificially intelligent software that uses 
a “creative tripod” of skill, appreciation, and imagination to develop its work 
and learn over time (Figure 2-20).57
Figure 2-20 
The Painting Fool - Sadness 1 (2007). 
Image from http://www.thepaintingfool.com/index.html.
57. Colton, Simon. 2008. 
“Creativity Versus the 
Perception of Creativity in 
Computational Systems.”
58. Tresset, Patrick, and Oliver 
Deussen. 2014. “Artistically 
Skilled Embodied Agents.”
59. Tresset, Patrick. 2017. “5 
Robots Named Paul.” 
60. Grosser, Benjamin. 2017. 
“Interactive Robotic Painting 
Machine.”
Iterative/Interactive Creativity
Another category of related work is the machines that follow a cyclical process 
of perceiving and then acting (similar to the cycle of see/embed – move/fuse 
outlined earlier). A prime example of this is Paul, a portrait-drawing robot. 
Paul, whose software is developed by Patrick Tressett, mimics the setting of a 
life-drawing art class. A human model is seated in front of the robot, which is 
equipped with a simple camera or webcam for an eye and a robotic arm with 
which it can draw. The robot uses a sequence of moves to draw salient features 
that it sees in the model (Figure 2-21).58 
In a recent drawing session, “5 Robots Named Paul” all performed simultaneously. 
Each robot observed the model from its own perspective and then turned to 
work on its own drawing, moving jerkily in ways that at times seem quaint, at 
other times eerily human. The whole setup is part performance art, part research 
tool, part computational creativity demonstration (Figure 2-22).59
Another example is the Interactive Robotic Painting Machine, by Benjamin Grosser. 
Instead of vision, this robot uses sound to influence its internal AI processes. The 
robot begins with a random series of brushstrokes. It listens to the sounds that occur 
in its environment during this painting process and then uses a genetic algorithm to 
evolve its gestures for the next round (Figure 2-23).60
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Figure 2-21 
[1] A model sitting in front of Paul (2012). Image from Tresset, Patrick, and Oliver Deussen. 2014. “Artistically Skilled 
Embodied Agents.” p. 3. Original photo by Steph Horak.  
[2] One of Paul’s drawings. Image from https://sites.google.com/site/5robotsnamedpaul/.
Figure 2-23 
Interactive Robotic Painting Machine - untitled paintings (2011). Images from  
http://bengrosser.com/projects/interactive-robotic-painting-machine/.
Figure 2-22 
5 Robots Named Paul during a performance drawing exhibit (2012). Image from https://sites.google.com/
site/5robotsnamedpaul/. Original photo by TOMMO: http://www.tommophoto.com/
1
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Computational Play
Most notably, several researchers have actually attempted to implement 
computational play. A group of researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology 
have developed a computational model of pretend play to use in a co-creative 
drawing agent.61 This program employs an enactive model of creativity and works 
with a human designer to collaboratively produce an abstract drawing (Figure 
2-24).62
Another example is the efforts of several researchers under the guidance of 
Ralf Der and Georg Martius. This body of work, which was recently collected 
into a book and corresponding website titled The Playful Machine, studies 
the ability of play to contribute to self-organization and learning in robotics. 
While most of the work is entirely software-based, some real-world machines 
are demonstrated as well. In each example, a computational subject is enabled 
with certain kinematic properties (related to a software or hardware “body”) 
and a thirst for knowledge. The subjects explore freely, usually starting with 
wild, chaotic movements of their limbs. Over time, the subjects learn about 
their own bodies and their environments, gradually mastering basic movements, 
overcoming certain obstacles, and demonstrating emergent behaviors (Figure 
2-25). This research handily demonstrates the potential of play in learning 
scenarios. While the behavior of the subjects is frantic and amusing at first, the 
apparent emergence of mastery is impressive to say the least.63
Figure 2-24  
Sample output of Davis et al.’s co-creative drawing agent. 
Image from Davis, et al. 2016. “Empirically Studying Participatory Sense-Making in 
Abstract Drawing with a Co-Creative Cognitive Agent.”
61. Davis, et al. 2015. “An 
Enactive Characterization of 
Pretend Play.”
62. Davis, et al. 2015. 
“An Enactive Model of 
Creativity for Computational 
Collaboration and Co-
Creation.”
63. Der, Ralf, and Georg 
Martius. 2012. The Playful 
Machine.
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Figure 2-25  
Still frames taken from a video showing one of Der and Martius’ computationally playful subjects 
learning to overcome a simulated barrier. Images from http://playfulmachines.com/videos.
html#vid:dog:climb1, Video 10.5, “Dog climbing over a barrier.” 
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(4)
(2)
(3)
Figure 3-26 (previous page) 
Author’s manipulation of Figure 3-27.
Figure 3-27 (above) 
Discretizing the exploratory path of play [1] into computational steps [2] 
represented by individual rule applications [3].
1
3
2
possible rules:
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
ending state 
possibility space defined by the rules of play
path of exploration
starting state
intermediate states as computational steps
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Defining Play
In chapter 2.3  Play, I reviewed the literature on play, collecting recurring 
characteristics that illuminate what it is we find most interesting about play 
behavior. The first contribution of my research is to provide my own working 
definition of play. 
But if the word has already been defined so many times, why add to the list? 
Game designer Brian Upton tackles this question head on, noting that the point 
of defining a term is not to create a permanent, all-encompassing link between 
the word and reality; rather, it is to guide a dialogue about the term toward an 
interesting or productive end. He adds that “multiple contradictory definitions can 
all be equally ‘correct’ if they each manage to independently structure a productive 
discourse.”64 My definition promotes a theory. With it, I hope to demonstrate that 
play as I define it is indeed amenable to digital implementation and that it can 
act as a critical bridge between creativity and computation. With that in mind: 
Play is the autotelic behavior of a subject 
temporarily exploring a system of rules. 
In terms of our diagramming strategy, making play computational simply 
involves the inclusion of discrete intermediate steps between the first and last 
stages of the play. The winding path of Figure 3-27 [1] now becomes a series 
of states that make up the computation [2]. Each of the steps between these 
states (again indicated by a double arrow) is the result of the application of one 
computational rule (referenced by the nearby number) [3]. 
3.1 Defining Computational Play
64. Upton, Brian. 2015. The 
Aesthetic of Play. p. 13
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This definition succinctly captures many of the qualities of Huizinga’s original 
description:
…a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of time 
and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its 
aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness 
that it is ‘different’ from ‘ordinary life.’  65
And closely resembles Upton’s more recent depiction of play as “free movement 
within a system of constraints.” 66
The definition concisely responds to each of the four categories described earlier 
(Figure 3-28). The behavior of the subject at play* is explicitly named, placing 
it at the core of play activity. Describing the player’s active and exploratory 
interaction with the rules implies the nonlinear, improvisational search for new 
possibility that dominates the play behavior. 
This exploration of rules also illuminates the attributes of play. Play’s rules 
are here interpreted as a collective system. These rules include restrictions on 
the player’s activity as well as new allowances – extensions of what is currently 
possible. The rules need not be exhaustively defined, and many rules might 
be imported by default from everyday life. What is important is that the rules 
represent a break from reality. Their instantiation as a system implies new ground 
for exploration, and new possibility to discover.
But most importantly, the intentions of the player and the value of play are 
brought to the front of the definition. Play is described as autotelic, meaning it 
is internally-motivated and self-fulfilling. As will be discussed later, in chapter 
3.3  Autotelism: The Potential of Play, it is the internal drive of autotelism that 
enables the player to explore with the level of freedom and curiosity that we see 
in full-fledged play.
*Importantly, the definition mentions a subject, without specifying that the subject 
is human, or even overly intelligent. This clarifies the relationship between play and 
player. Play may describe the behavior, but I, unlike Gadamer, am defining play as an 
activity that necessitates a subject. My discussions of play imply a subject-at-play, with 
the characteristics of the play reflected in the player. Choosing to incorporate the subject 
is critical, because it legitimizes the question of why we play.
65. Huizinga, Johan. 2014. 
Homo Ludens. p. 28
66. Upton, Brian. 2015. The 
Aesthetic of Play. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. p. 15
observable
inferred
playplayer
exploratory, engaging
(nonlinear, improvisational)
temporary, rule-based
(unreal, alternative)
autotelic
(internally-driven, curious)
autotelic
(self-fulfilling)
BEHAVIOR ATTRIBUTES
INTENTIONS VALUE
Figure 3-28  
Using the definition of play to address all four categories of play research.
473 Computational Play Framework
67. www.merriam-webster.
com/
Definition
To understand the role of autotelism in play and its potential for computation, 
it is useful to study its opposite: heterotelism. Merriam-Webster defines 
heterotelic as “existing for the sake of something else: having an extraneous end 
or purpose.”67 The simplest way to understand this term is to conceive of it as a 
type of motivation. Considered in the context of a subject engaged in an activity 
(a player at play), heterotelism becomes an action that is motivated by a reason 
not directly relevant to the activity at hand – in other words, heterotelism locates 
the motivation for acting external to the activity of the player. This makes sense 
when we consider that the word comes from the Greek hetero, meaning other or 
different, and telos, or goal. 
Limitation
Heterotelism’s impact becomes clear when we explore its manifestation in 
computation. Ultimately, the decision to continue a heterotelic activity comes 
from a source outside the activity itself. In computational terms, that external 
force determines whether or not the current state of the computation is adequate 
– whether or not the exploration should continue. That force drives the action 
to continue until an endpoint is reached, and when an endpoint is reached, the 
external force decides whether or not it is a successful conclusion. Essentially, 
heterotelism specifies the exit conditions governing the computation.
Heterotelic behavior in computation is therefore not a specification of what 
action to take, or how to take it, but rather a method of judging the current 
state of things. Judging the current state based on adherence to a model external 
to the exploration removes the actual decision-making responsibility from the 
subject and places it in the external model. 
In practice, this means that decisions are made:
•	 actively, by another subject,
•	 ahead of time, by another subject, or
•	 based on adherence to a large number of examples.
In the first case, the computer is simply a tool in the use of another subject 
(such as a human). In the second case, the space of possibilities is predefined 
by the human programmer. In the final case, we see the basic framework for 
deep learning: Collect vast amounts of examples and learn based on what 
already exists. 
In the end, no matter what mechanism a heterotelic subject uses to advance a 
computation, it still relies upon reinforcement and confirmation from a model 
that is determined externally. Heterotelism, then, turns out to be an excellent 
description for the common thread running through computational models of 
artificial intelligence. As discussed in chapter 2.2  Computation + AI, whether 
it is subjectively fashioned after the reasoning of humans or objectively modeled 
3.2 Heterotelism: The Limitation of Computation
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on the more rational scientific method, AI always appeals to an external source 
to ultimately decide what is right and wrong. This external source is the same as 
heterotelism’s exit condition. 
In terms of play behavior, the existence of an external source breaks the circle 
(Figure 3-29). The rules that govern the play are no longer dominant, and the 
play activity is conducted with reference to the external model, rather than with 
reference to the play space.
Insisting upon an external reference affects the overall character of a 
computational search. Ultimately, heterotelic computation describes the 
success of the process in terms of how well the result matches the external 
reference. In Stiny’s terms, this is committing to description before 
calculation.68 If our description precedes our calculation, then we are 
orienting ourselves based on predetermined goals. Our activity is guided by, 
and modeled after, the initial description. 
Another way to conceive of this is as what Dewey dubbed a quest for certainty. 
He writes: “The quest for certainty is a quest for a peace which is assured, an 
object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action casts.” 69
Figure 3-29  
Heterotelism breaks the circle of play in order to reference an external model.
68. Stiny, George. 2015. “The 
Critic as Artist.”
69. Dewey, John. 1929. The 
Quest for Certainty: A Study of 
the Relation of Knowledge and 
Action. p. 8
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Using the same word, craftsman David Pye speaks of the workmanship of 
certainty. He describes this as workmanship that attempts to predetermine the 
result before the work begins. Pye uses the example of printing, where the process 
is unified to the point that each produced print is an exact copy of the others.70 
Ingold captures these ideas in another term: the mechanical ideal. Ingold writes:
But while I would concede that the perfect machine is an ideal that cannot be 
realised in practice, the mechanical ideal is nevertheless driven by an aspiration 
of systemic closure. While in operation, the machine is designed to be as exact as 
possible in the execution of a course determined by settings fixed in advance. It 
should not feel anything even though perhaps it does.71
All of these descriptions appeal to the same idea: Novelty is discouraged 
in favor of predictability. Heterotelism relies upon an external model for 
certainty and orients the search process toward a mechanical ideal. If we are 
constantly guiding our behavior based on this standard, we short-circuit our 
ability to discover. Our aim becomes the complete and accurate representation 
of the world as it is, instead of how it could be. Heterotelic actions orient 
toward more of the same. While heterotelic behavior may technically be able 
to discover anything, it tends not to.
Conclusion
Deep learning, one of the most popular current fields of artificial intelligence 
research, is the latest example in a tradition of heterotelic behavior in computation: 
It utilizes massive amounts of existing content to guide the behavior of a 
computational search. Such behavior is antithetical to design. Design is more 
than service to external models, because design occasionally generates content 
that cannot be judged by existing models. It is this fundamental search for novelty 
that places design behavior at odds with heterotelism. Design strives to ask an 
interesting question – one that will generate exciting new answers. As a form 
of artistic expression, design does not always seek to match what the world has 
already produced. A subject exploring under the guidance of heterotelism is not 
free to explore. While heterotelism might be appropriate in many computational 
applications, it is unable to fully capture design thinking. 
70. Pye, David. 1995. The 
Nature and Art of Workmanship. 
71. Ingold, Tim. 2010. “The 
Textility of Making.” p. 98
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Figure 3-30  
Autotelic processes are internally driven, but what do they reference?
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3.3 Autotelism: The Potential of Play
Definition
Having analyzed the limitations of heterotelism, let us return to autotelism. 
Merriam-Webster defines autotelic as “having a purpose in and not apart 
from itself.” 72 Drawing on the logic used in the previous chapter, we can view 
autotelism in terms of its motivational force: Autotelism locates the motivation 
for continuing an activity internal to the activity. Csikszentmihalyi reinforces 
this, writing that:
An autotelic person needs few material possessions and little entertainment, 
comfort, power, or fame because so much of what he or she does is already 
rewarding…They are more autonomous and independent because they cannot 
be as easily manipulated with threats or rewards from the outside. 73
Potential
In computational terms, autotelism seems conceptually more difficult to 
understand than heterotelism. Before, the computation used an external model 
to evaluate and guide the search process; here, however, no such model is 
provided. The question becomes: What does the computation reference? (Figure 
3-30) Such a model can hardly be called a goal. It can’t really offer guidance, as it 
has no global understanding of how the exploration is going. The model knows 
only what possibilities remain, if any. 
In fact, the internal model of autotelism is far simpler than its external, heterotelic 
counterpart. The goal of autotelic activity is the activity itself. In computational 
terms, this relates to the renewal of the computational loop – the exit condition 
that tells the process when to stop. The reason for renewal, therefore, is simply 
to continue the exploration.
It is critical that this decision be agnostic of any external evaluation criteria. 
Autotelic activity does not necessarily change course when the current search 
isn’t going well; nor does it necessarily stop when a predefined goal state is 
reached. The autotelic subject is curious. She continues because there is more to 
explore, and because she wants to see what else is possible. Autotelism places the 
control firmly in the hands of the subject conducting the exploration, absolving 
her from constraints of time, or budget, or computational efficiency. Autotelism 
permits the user to choose – and change – the constraints at will.
This behavior shows up repeatedly in various descriptions of creative pursuits:
In discussing what they call technologies of foolishness, political scientists and 
organizational theorists James G. March and Johan Olsen describe the role 
of playfulness in organizational management: “Playfulness is the deliberate, 
temporary relaxation of rules in order to explore the possibilities of alternative 
rules. When we are playful, we challenge the necessity of consistency…
Playfulness allows experimentation.” The authors argue that this type of 
behavior must be permitted in organizations if they are to develop their 
conception of themselves.74
72. www.merriam-webster.
com/
73. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. 
1997. Finding Flow: The 
Psychology of Engagement with 
Everyday Life. p. 117
74. March, James G., 
and Johan P. Olsen. 1976. 
Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organizations. p. 261
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Sociologists Harry Collins and Martin Kusch describe polimorphic activity 
as that which is intentionally variable, listing human conversation as a 
classic example. They contrast this with mimeomorphic actions, which refer 
to copying. While mimeomorphic actions are designed to remove variation 
and maintain consistency, polimorphic actions vary inherently, in service of 
human interaction.75
As described by anthropologist Eitan Wilf, the act of improvisation in jazz can 
be seen as the pursuit of newness for newness’s sake. Wilf discusses in detail the 
difficulty of jazz education, describing how students struggle to resist using the 
techniques (or licks) they have memorized, even if these techniques fit within the 
typical vocabulary of jazz.76
Contrasting his definition of the workmanship of certainty, Pye describes the 
workmanship of risk as: 
...workmanship…in which the quality of the result is not predetermined, but 
depends on the judgment, dexterity, and care which the maker exercises as he 
works... The workmanship of risk has no exclusive prerogative of quality. What 
it has exclusively is an immensely various range of qualities, without which at its 
command the art of design becomes arid and impoverished. 77
Conclusion
As an autotelic activity, play is allowed to wander. Play breaks the rules without 
any justification other than curiosity. Play does not always seek the optimal 
answer, occasionally pursuing suboptimal paths. Play remains open to the 
possibility of questions it hasn’t yet asked, and solutions it hasn’t yet considered. 
Autotelism can be difficult to fit into a dialogue dominated by discussions 
of problem-solving, optimization, ration, and the scientific method, but it is 
essential to both play and the creative process. Autotelism permits the playful 
subject to explore new possibilities.
We see this same pursuit in design. The designer often suspends external 
considerations in favor of free exploration. This process – of prioritizing 
exploration over optimization, or calculation over description – is critical to 
design’s search for novel meaning and experience. The autotelism in play allows 
us to look past our own preconceptions. Without it, we act like deep learners: 
interpreting everything based on what we’ve seen before. Play must be autotelic 
in order to enable the type of free, curious behavior that pushes creative design. 
75. Collins, H. M., and 
Martin Kusch. 1998. The Shape 
of Actions: What Humans and 
Machines Can Do.
76. Wilf, Eitan. 2010. 
“Swinging within the Iron 
Cage: Modernity, Creativity, 
and Embodied Practice in 
American Postsecondary Jazz 
Education.”
77. Pye, David. 1995. The 
Nature and Art of Workmanship. 
p. 20-23
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observable
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playplayer - at - 
MULTIMODAL
GENERATIVE
ITERATIVE
AUTOTELIC
Figure 3-31 
Computational play framework. The player and play are merged into one category,  
and both observable and inferred characteristics are addressed.
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3.4 Implementing Computational Play
Overall Framework
The implementation of computational play proposed here addresses both the 
observable and the inferred characteristics of play. As will be discussed shortly, 
the reason for addressing both categories is less about taking an ideological stance 
regarding strong and weak play as it is a belief that the inferred characteristic – 
autotelism – unlocks the potential for creative design behavior. The framework 
also largely ignores the distinction between play and player, instead merging the 
two into a unified player-at-play. 
The characteristics of this  framework, illustrated in Figure 3-31, are as follows: 
Computational play is facilitated by multimodal representation conducted by 
the subject. This can take a variety of forms, but the process must be significant 
enough that it requires the subject to translate its own work between different 
modalities, reinterpreting the content along the way. An example is the designer’s 
tendency to sketch. This externalizing process is key to the designer’s ability to 
shed a cognitive bias and approach a topic from a different perspective.  Insisting 
on multiple modes of representation acknowledges that the process of translation 
often ignites our subconscious, causing the kind of insight that often proves so 
fruitful to the design process.
The second characteristic of computational play is its focus on generative 
techniques that do not rely upon results for justification. Designers – as well as 
many other artisans, craftsman, and creative professionals – improvise. Action 
often precedes understanding (or in shape grammar terminology, calculation 
precedes description). Rule-based behaviors, such as those used in shape 
grammars, work well in this regard, as they specify behavior without relying 
upon efficiency or other heuristics for guidance.
Third, computational play is iterative. Combined with the insistence upon 
multimodal representation, this lends play a cyclical structure reminiscent 
of the design processes outlined independently by both Stiny and Schön in 
chapter 2.1  Design + Drawing. Iteration opens the design process up to 
shifting contexts and changing requirements. Iteration grants the same level of 
importance to both question and problem. At the same time, it also results in 
a natural discretization of the creative process that is conveniently applicable 
to computation. 
Finally, and most importantly, computational play should be autotelic. While 
the three traits described up until this point provide a strong framework for 
observable playful activity, autotelism is the key to untethering the subject and 
encouraging the kind of curious exploration at the center of play, and thus will 
be described in expanded detail.
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Autotelism and Emergent Design Behavior
As will be detailed in chapter 4.2  Computational Software, the autotelic 
component of computational play is implemented during the rule application 
stage of the computation. While all of the stages contribute to playful behavior, it 
is important to include autotelism in the rule application stage due to this stage’s 
position on the cusp between what has already happened and what could happen. 
During the rule application stage, all of the possible next moves are determined 
based on the visible shapes and the available drawing rules. Depending on what 
the machine sees and how its rules are configured, the number of possible moves 
could be incredibly high, or incredibly low. This variable is the first parameter 
driving the autotelic component (Figure 3-32).
To reiterate, the autotelism in computational play is an attempt at self-
perpetuation. Divorced from any attachment to external model or heuristic, 
the autotelic component simply evaluates how many possibilities are available 
to the subject. As the number of possibilities increases, so does the likelihood of 
the play continuing. This captures designers’ natural curiosity about unexplored 
possibilities and reflects the tendency of the playful designer to explore for the 
sake of exploring. 
In reality, autotelism isn’t nearly so linear. This relationship (between the 
number of possibilities and the likelihood of continuing) only paints part of the 
Figure 3-32 
Variable #1: Are there more possibilities to explore? 
In this case, applying rule #4 will yield a previously-unexplored color.
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
rules:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(4)
(2)
(4)
(3)
rules:
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape 
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
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picture. This first axis is objective. Even if the components under consideration 
are internal to the play space, they remain independent of the subject. Since 
this discussion of play necessitates the role of a player, we must also take into 
consideration the subjective axis of autotelism. In other words, we must also 
consider whether or not the player wants to keep playing, and acknowledge that 
this variable might exist entirely independent of the number of possibilities. 
Of course, defining the interest level of the subject is no easy task. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it has been reduced to a simple randomly varying value. 
This is a reduction of what is ultimately an extremely complicated topic; however, 
the purpose of this thesis is to argue for its role in the process of play, not devise 
the optimal method for its implementation (Figure 3-33).
The result is a 2D representation of the subject’s decision space, in which the 
X-axis represents the size of the possibility space, while the Y-axis represents 
the interest level of the subject. The brightness of any point on the graph 
represents the likelihood that the subject will continue playing, from black 
(quit) to white (continue). A medium-grey value indicates that the decision 
may go either way. The predictability of this space is fairly straightforward: If 
the subject has little interest in the task and few available possibilities, the play 
will likely be terminated, as indicated by the dark lower left-hand corner. On 
the other hand, if the interest is high and the possibilities are many, the play 
is likely to continue, as indicated by the bright upper right-hand corner. The 
opposite corners, where one value is high but the other is low, balance out to 
Figure 3-33  
Variable #2: Do I want to keep playing? 
This variable embodies the subjectivity of the machine.
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
rules:
?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(4)
(2)
(3)
rules:
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape 
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
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an unpredictable mid-grey, indicating that the decision could go either way. 
This is the same in the center of the graph, where both variables have neutral 
values and no reliable prediction can be made (Figure 3-34). So far, this model 
of performance doesn’t seem to stray too far from the way we might expect our 
machines to behave.
What the graph also displays, however, is a measure of intentionality on the 
part of the player. All four corners are easily attributable, as the extreme values 
(from one or both axes) yield straightforward cues to behavioral choices. Only 
in the center, where neither axis holds significant sway over the decision, does 
attribution dissipate (Figure 3-35). 
Figure 3-34 
Autotelic behavior space, with level of predictability indicated. 
The brightness (amount of black or white) of any point in the space indicates the 
likelihood that the activity will continue.
Figure 3-35 
Autotelic behavior space, with level of attribution indicated. 
The brightness (amount of black or white) of any point in the space indicates the 
likelihood that the activity will continue.
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In both the upper-left and the lower-right corners, the mismatch between the 
size of the possibility space and the interest level of the subject results in a kind 
of subjective volatility. The behavior here is unpredictable, demonstrated by the 
medium-brightness that results from the opposition between the two variables, 
but entirely attributable, due to the presence of one extremely high variable. 
Adding a blue-green color gradient along this second axis helps visualize a much 
richer field of possible decision-making behavior (Figure 3-36).
In the upper left-hand corner, the frustration results from an interested subject 
whose possible options are slim. In this situation, for the sake of continuing 
the play, the subject might justify a number of behaviors that defy traditional 
heterotelic computation: The subject might choose to start the drawing over, or 
erase part of the drawing in order to focus on a particular section. The subject 
might continue with a drawing that seems particularly fruitless, knowing that it 
may yield new insights in the future. And finally, the subject may break the rules, 
modifying its own actions in order to open up new possibilities. 
In the lower right corner, when the interest is low but the possibility space is 
high, this frustration could have the opposite effect. The subject may give up, 
quitting the drawing process despite the available avenues. Such an avenue might 
seem undesirable, but to deny that possibility would be against the spirit of the 
thesis. Cherry-picking a subject’s behavior is no less controlling than supplying 
an external model for the subject to reference. 
Figure 3-36 
Autotelic behavior space, with behavior predictability and attributability noted. 
The brightness (amount of black or white) of any point in the space indicates the likelihood 
that the activity will continue. The blue and green colors begin to indicate the emergence of 
interesting, unpredictable, attributable behaviors.
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Figure 3-37  
A subject whose interest level is high, but possibility space is low may break the 
rules to continue the play. In this case, the subject adds a new rule to her repertoire, 
enabling her to add yellow to the shape and expanding the possibility space of the play.
The potential of autotelism is the emergence of subjective, unpredictable, 
attributable behavior. As designers, our curiosity propels us to experiment with 
an idea, even if there’s no need to do so. We make our own way, often ignoring 
external guidance. Similarly, a child who finds that the rules of her game don’t 
offer her the flexibility to play as she pleases will change the rules to suit her 
needs in a heartbeat (Figure 3-37).
5.    add 20% yellow to shape 
(5)
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
5. add 20% yellow to shape
rules:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(4)
(2)
(3)
rules:
1. add 20% cyan to shape
2. remove 20% cyan from shape 
3. add 20% magenta to shape
4. remove 20% magenta from shape
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4 Drawing Machine
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DRAW ERASE
Figure 4-38 (above) 
Exploded axonometric of drawing machine.
Figure 4-39 (previous page) 
Author’s manipulation of Figure 4-38.
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4.1 Machine Hardware
The machine hardware is a Makeblock XY Plotter (V2.0) resting on a 2’x2’ 
acrylic base.79 The axes are powered by three stepper motors, which are 
controlled by an Arduino Uno microcontroller using a CNC shield with three 
separate stepper drivers. The X- and Y-axes have a plottable area of roughly 
263 x 380mm. The Z-axis is outfitted with both a dry-erase marker and an 
eraser. The stepper motor for this axis is fixed with an elliptical rotor. Resting 
on this rotor are two separate 3D-printed mechanisms that individually hold 
the marker and the eraser. As the motor turns, the elliptical rotor causes one 
mechanism to rise while the other falls; turning in the other direction reverses 
the motion (Figure 4-38, Figure 4-42).* When the rotor is positioned so the 
long axis of the ellipse is horizontal, both marker and eraser are lifted above the 
acrylic base. In this way, the machine is capable of both additive and subtractive 
drawing procedures. 
A webcam sits near the center of the machine, approximately 260 mm above 
the surface of the acrylic base (Figure 4-40, Figure 4-44). The webcam is able 
to capture a portion of the drawing area approximately 213 x 160mm. In order 
to ensure an evenly-lit drawing surface, LED lights line the underside of the 
machine around the entire perimeter (Figure 4-45).
*The offset between the marker and the eraser is controlled for in the software portion 
of the setup.
As a way to develop and refine my proposed theory, I have developed a 
computational drawing machine that is capable of autotelic play. The machine 
is able to plot a drawing, view the drawing, and make decisions based on what 
it sees. As such, it brings computational vision and computational drawing 
together into a cyclical process that permits the use of play behaviors. Designing 
a real-world implementation from the ground up has permitted me to explore 
how my theories of play, and especially autotelism, might be implemented 
computationally. Many of the processes used are fairly straightforward: The setup 
does not employ complex deep learning techniques. As such, I have demonstrated 
that play does not have to be a “deep” or overly complicated process, and that it 
can be implemented even in relatively low-level computational scenarios. 
The machine is both an object-to-think-with 78 and a proof-of-concept of my 
framework for computational play. The research process has been cyclical, as 
I have used my theoretical research to drive my physical implementation, and 
then used what I learned during the implementation process to refine my 
understanding of the theory. 
78. Papert, Seymour. 1993. 
Mindstorms: Children, 
Computers, and Powerful Ideas.
79. For more on Makeblock, 
visit http://www.makeblock.
com/.
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A connected computer acts as the digital brain to this plotter hand and webcam 
eye. All of the computational processes – the webcam feed, the digital drawing 
manipulations, and the G-code processing – are managed in Grasshopper for 
Rhino. This parametric, node-based, visual coding environment significantly 
extends Rhino’s already highly-customizable 3D modeling workspace.80 
The components for receiving the video feed and communicating with the 
Arduino are provided by Firefly, an extension for Grasshopper. This package 
of tools, developed by Andy Payne, facilitates interactive communication 
between Grasshopper and an immense range of input/output devices, such as 
Arduino.81 The computational processes are managed in Grasshopper, and the 
resulting G-code is communicated to the Arduino using Firefly. The Arduino 
then uses pre-loaded Grbl software to process the G-code into commands for 
the plotter’s motors.
Figure 4-40 
Photo of drawing machine with overhead webcam.
80. For more on Grasshopper, 
visit http://www.grasshopper3d.
com/.
81. For more on Firefly, visit 
http://www.fireflyexperiments.
com/.
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Figure 4-41 
[1, 2, 4] Detail photos of the machine’s drawing mechanism. 
[3] Detail photo of an earlier iteration of the drawing mechanism (without eraser).
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Figure 4-42 
Detail photos of drawing machine Z-axis, showing Draw [1], PenUp [2], and Erase modes [3].
1 2 3
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Figure 4-43 
Overhead view of drawing machine.
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Figure 4-44 
Drawing machine with overhead camera.
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Figure 4-45 
Drawing machine with under-frame LEDs illuminated.
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Figure 4-46 
Drawing machine with iterative embed-choose-fuse cycle overlaid.
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Echoing the design process espoused by both Stiny and Schön, the machine 
works through an iterative cycle of seeing and moving, or embedding and 
fusing. The computational framework is divided into three sections: machine 
vision, rule application, and plotting. These roughly align with the embed-
fuse / see-move cycle (Figure 2-10), with the additional rule application stage 
representing the conscious processes we use to decide what to draw. This 
portion addresses the eponymous question in Stiny’s “What rule(s) should 
I choose?,”82 encompassing the possible drawing rules, the mechanism that 
chooses which rule to apply, as well as the autotelism component into a single 
stage of the computation. The resulting cycle , illustrated in Figure 4-46, is 
embed-choose-fuse.*  
While shape grammars is the inspiration for much of the machine’s processes, 
the machine is more than just a shape grammar implementation. In a paper 
outlining the possibilities for digital implementations of shape grammars, James 
Gips describes three types of programs:
•	 an interpreter, which is provided with a grammar and generates possible 
shapes,
•	 a parsing program, which is provided with a grammar and a shape and 
determines if the grammar could have produced the shape (and if so, the 
sequence of rules needed to do so), and
•	 an inference program, which is provided with a number of resultant shapes 
and concocts a possible grammar that could generate those shapes.83
The parsing and inference program illustrate the analytical effort in shape 
grammars. These programs work retroactively to understand what is needed for 
a computational process to generate a particular result, or set of results. In fact, 
the inference program draws a striking similarity to deep learning software. In 
both, the program is tasked with understanding (or inferring) the underlying 
similarities in a set of examples. Where deep learning tends to focus on image 
recognition and categorization, however, inference programs go further to 
imagine an entire temporal sequence of construction.
The first category, the interpreters, are the generative shape grammar programs. 
The computational framework outlined here incorporates an interpreter in the 
rule application stage, closely coupled with the autotelic mechanism that decides 
whether or not the process should continue. As noted, the framework goes 
beyond this to include the full cycle of design drawing: the vision that embeds 
meaning into the content on the page, and the physical plotting that fuses the 
content together, to be seen anew. 
4.2 Computational Software
82. Stiny, George. 2011. 
“What Rule(s) Should I Use?” 
83. Gips, James. 1999. 
“Computer Implementation of 
Shape Grammars.” 
*In reality, our vision, cognition, and action processes mix and overlap, influencing each 
other in ways that defy any hard-and-fast boundaries. While I respect the importance 
of this intermingling (and even the possibility that certain aspects of play behavior may 
rely upon it for full effect) I maintain that play can be implemented even in a simplified, 
separated, and streamlined computational framework such as this.
74 Toward Computational Play
21
3
5
4
6
Figure 4-47 
Workflow showing digital geometry construction using custom machine vision components. Webcam footage [1] 
is processed into a high-contrast image [2]. Digital points are plotted along the dark lines [3], and these are then 
connected into rough interpretations of lines [4]. This geometry is cleaned into closed geometry [5], which is used to 
develop a connectivity network of drawing nodes and edges [6].
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STAGE 1 - EMBED (MACHINE VISION)
First, the machine views its drawing.* 
The webcam feed is imported into Grasshopper at a resolution of 320 x 240px. 
While a higher or lower resolution image can be supplied (the computation 
accounts for changes in resolution and scales accordingly), this size provided the 
best trade-off between quality and speed (Figure 4-47, [1]). 
The image is immediately processed into a usable format. This step can vary 
depending on changing lighting levels on the drawing surface, but in general it 
only needs to be done once at the start of the drawing process. The contrast of 
the image is increased to allow for better recognition of drawing and canvas, and 
the image is then passed through a threshold filter that converts it into a binary 
black (drawing) and white (canvas) format. Finally, this image is slightly blurred, 
to smooth out the gradients and eliminate noise [2]. 
The next step is to extract vector information from the scalar grid of pixels. The 
computer cycles through each pixel in the image, isolating those that exceed 
a certain darkness threshold. In addition, the computer creates a digital point 
representing each dark pixel, using the pixel’s column and row as X- and Y 
-coordinates, respectively [3]. 
The computer then cycles through each dark pixel that it found in the image. 
From each pixel, the computer extracts a gradient vector, which, when turned 
90 degrees, represents the tangent at that particular place in the drawing. This 
vector is used to trace a digital line through the drawing. The digital point 
created earlier is moved along the vector by a set distance; a new pixel is analyzed 
based on the point’s updated position; and the new pixel is checked to see if 
it still exceeds the darkness threshold. The trace continues like this, moving 
incrementally through the drawing, until it reaches pixels that are no longer 
dark enough, at which point the trace completes. As the trace moves through the 
drawing, the computer removes the dark pixels it crosses from its original list, to 
avoid unnecessary duplication. The computer does this for all of the dark pixels 
in the image, resulting in a mass of short line segments that roughly capture the 
drawn geometry [4]. 
This rough geometry is then smoothed into a cleaner interpretation. Each group 
of points representing a line segment is compared to the other groups. If the 
groups of points represent points that are essentially parallel and contiguous, 
then the two groups are merged. Once this is done, the groups of points are 
sorted into a linear order, which is used to construct larger line segments. Since 
the digital lines typically stop short of or overlap their real-world counterparts, 
they are then extended or trimmed. To do this, each line’s endpoint is used to 
determine the closest neighboring line. If the neighboring line is close enough, 
the original line is extended (or trimmed) to meet it (Figure 4-47, [5]).
This step presupposes that content already exists. There are several methods for achieving 
this: The machine might have a “step 0” that generates initial content; a rule can be 
provided that generates content at any point if none is seen; or a separate party (such as 
a human observer) might provide a drawing for the machine to view.
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Figure 4-48 
Collection of all possible closed shapes gathered during machine vision stage.
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Next, this geometry is converted into a network of nodes and edges. Each line 
is first split at its intersections. Then, all of the lines’ endpoints are analyzed 
for proximity and converted into a group of unique nodes. Each line and its 
nodes are stored in a dictionary, which is used to build a connectivity network 
representing the drawing. The resulting network is simply a data tree that has 
each node as a branch, and its neighboring nodes as leaves [6]. 
Searching through this network, the computer determines every possible closed, 
non-self-intersecting path that exists in the drawing. The computer starts 
at each node, sets up a possible path, and tests each neighboring node. The 
possible paths are organized into a queue that is updated as paths are analyzed. 
If the neighboring node is viable (i.e., has not yet been visited), the path adds 
that node. If the path completes (i.e., reaches the start node), it is stored as a 
successful shape. If the path encounters a node that has already been visited, it 
goes to the next neighboring node. If the path runs out of neighboring nodes to 
test, the computer begins to backtrack, moving back through the drawing and 
testing each branch in the queue as it goes. Ultimately, after all the possible paths 
have been analyzed, the computer backtracks all the way to the start node, and 
begins the entire process anew at the next start node. 
The computer then analyzes each resultant path to remove duplicates. Each 
path is tested against the others. If the paths are the same length, then the 
computer attempts to find a shared node between them. If a shared node is 
found, the computer then iterates through both paths (in both directions), to 
the end of the path. If the paths prove to be comprised of the same nodes, then 
one of them is removed.
Finally, since the paths are actually just strings of integers representing particular 
nodes in the drawing, the computer then uses each viable, unique path to build 
a digital geometrical representation of the shape (Figure 4-48). These shapes are 
then provided to the next stage of the computation. 
STAGE 2 - CHOOSE (RULE APPLICATION)
In the rule application stage, the computer determines all of its possible next 
moves, whether it not or will continue, and which move it will ultimately take 
(Figure 4-49). 
The drawing rules are supplied beforehand. These rules use the lines of the 
supplied shapes to determine whether or not each shape matches a particular 
description. The rule steps through each line in the shape, comparing it against 
the previous line to determine if it represents an angle in the shape, or just a 
parallel continuation of the previous line. Each registered angle is compared 
to an optional desired angle. Finally, the number of angles and the level of fit 
between the angles and the desired angle are used to determine if the shape 
indeed matches the supplied description. 
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Figure 4-49 
Pseudocode workflow outlining the rule application stage. At the left, subshapes from the first stage are provided. In the 
center, each subshape is passed through each rule application. The rules can be as simple as the first example (triangle 
rotation) or as complex as the last one (computing the opposite of the shape’s convex hull). After all of the rules are 
applied, one resulting shape is chosen.
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For instance, in order to recognize all equilateral triangles amongst the shapes, 
the rule may look for shapes that have three angles, each of which is close to 60 
degrees. A shape that violates either of these rules is not counted as an equilateral 
triangle. Alternatively, if the rule is to search for any and all triangles, the degree 
stipulation is discarded. If the rule is to search for rectangles, the number of 
angles becomes four, and the desired angle becomes 90. To search for squares 
in particular, the rule can measure the length of the line segments in order to 
ensure that each side of the shape is roughly equal to the others.
Having discovered all of the shapes that match a particular description, the 
actual rule application portion is carried out. For instance, if the rule stipulates 
a rotation of an equilateral triangle, then the center point of the supplied shape 
is found, and the line segments are rotated 180 degrees around that point. 
Importantly, this type of rule includes both additive and subtractive processes 
in its transformation. To satisfy this, the computer stores lines to draw as well as 
lines to erase. 
Any number of rules can be supplied. Each rule processes all of the supplied 
shapes, analyzing which shapes match the given description and computing the 
geometry that results from the rule application. All of these possible results are 
collected together into a data tree in which each branch is a possible drawing 
action, and the leaves include lines to both erase and draw. 
The computer then chooses which result to draw. For the purposes of this thesis, 
this procedure is kept incredibly simple: The computer randomly chooses a 
drawing to plot. In reality, this decision-making process would be very specific 
and depend upon the complex, subjective preferences of the drawer. However, it 
is my intention to show that the autotelic portion of play need not be bound to 
this process, and thus I have reduced it to a random procedure.
As described earlier, the rule application portion of the computation also 
includes the computational implementation of autotelism. This component is 
not a complex (or deep) computational concept. While the full development 
of machine subjectivity may be years away, the other factor (the size of the 
possibility space) is simple to calculate, and the actual logic gate for quitting 
or continuing a playful drawing process is a straightforward implementation. 
A function is constructed for each variable that independently relates it to the 
likelihood of continuing. In the case of the size of the possibility space, this 
permits the flexibility to stipulate an appropriate range (five possible options 
may be slim pickings in some scenarios, but plenty in others). Once these two 
functions have generated their independent values, a net value is determined 
(either through an unweighted average or a weighted one). This value determines 
whether or not the play should continue. 
Implementing the autotelism component during the rule application stage 
allows it to take full advantage of the fact that the rules stipulate the size of 
the possibility space. A predetermined range allows the number of current 
possibilities to be ranked as a value. Once again, an arbitrary value is substituted 
for the interest level of the machine. These two values constitute the autotelism 
of the machine.
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Figure 4-50 
Pseudocode workflow outlining plotting components. In [1], the toolpath is created. Black lines are PenUp travel paths, 
grey lines are lines to be erased, and green lines are lines to be drawn. [2] shows this path broken into points, which 
become the Gcode for the plotter.
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STAGE 3 - FUSE (PLOTTING)
Finally, the computer instructs the plotter to draw the new geometry. 
First, the supplied lines are connected together into polylines. These are then 
used to construct a toolpath. This toolpath incorporates the initial travel path 
from the plotter’s home position to the start of the geometry; each polyline to 
draw; the travel paths in between each separate geometry; and finally the travel 
path back to the home position (Figure 4-50, [1]).
The lines and polylines in the toolpath are then converted into points. The start- 
and endpoints of the line or polyline are included, and if the line or polyline 
exceeds a given length, it is subdivided into smaller sections [2].* 
The computer creates three separate data trees from this process, each with the 
exact same number of branches and leaves. The first tree contains all of the 
points, with each line or polyline in the geometry acting as a branch and the 
points acting as leaves. The second tree contains Boolean values that determine 
whether or not the pen should be lifted from the drawing surface, and the third 
tree contains Boolean values that determine whether or not the eraser should be 
lifted from the drawing surface. 
In order to send the geometry to the plotter, the computer then cycles through 
each item in each of these trees simultaneously, using the values to construct a 
Gcode string that the plotter can process. The resulting string contains all of the 
information the plotter needs to move to the next position in the form of X, Y, 
and Z values. 
Finally, the Gcode is sent to the plotter. Each line of Gcode is sent individually,** 
until the drawing is complete. At the end of the drawing, the plotter returns 
to the home position, and the entire computation iterates, returning to the 
machine vision stage.
*The distance between points is determined by the speed and capabilities of the plotter. 
For this thesis, a distance of 1.5mm was used.
**Again, the speed settings of the Gcode transfer and the plotter depend upon the 
capabilities of both the computer and the plotter. A refresh time of 20-40ms was used 
for the majority of these studies, resulting in 25-50 points being sent per second.
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MULTIMODAL: physical-digital
GENERATIVE: rule-based action
ITERATIVE: embed-choose-fuse
AUTOTELIC: internally-driven
Figure 4-51 
The drawing machine manifests each of the four traits of the computational play framework.
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4.3 Encouraging Play
The implementation described above embodies the four characteristics described 
in the computational play framework (Figure 4-51). 
First, the machine works between multiple modes of representation, forcing 
itself to reinterpret and reconceptualize the drawing with each iteration. 
In doing so, it is unable to rely upon prior description, and therefore avoids 
Bergson’s stated tendency to default to what is already known.84 By forcing the 
machine to reinterpret its drawing with each iteration, the process pivots from 
likely defaulting to what it already knows to likely seeing alternative possibilities. 
Surprising new configurations are not avoided, but pursued. 
Second, the machine’s behavior is driven by well-defined rules. Using a shape 
grammar to define the system of rules makes the space of possible actions 
explicit for each iteration. The rules of the grammar act as the primary rules 
structuring the play space and driving the play. Within this space, all possibilities 
are considered.* Every shape that is passed to the rule application stage of the 
computation is tested to see if it matches any of the given descriptions, and is 
transformed accordingly. This insistence on acknowledging the possibilities of 
the present satisfies art historian David Summers’ characterization of play as 
“permutational in the sense that it tends to realize all possibilities, and...liminal 
in the sense that it seeks the limits of possibilities.” 85
Third, the machine draws through an iterative process of embedding, choosing, 
and fusing. This is a process familiar to designers and useful for the same reasons 
outlined earlier: To iterate is to acknowledge one’s inability to fully predict all 
of the future’s possibilities. Cyclical iteration allows the subject to step back 
and analyze the process from varying perspectives, avoiding the bias inherent in 
sticking with one perspective and opening the exploration up to new insight.
And finally, the machine is autotelic. It considers both the number of available 
possibilities as well as its own interest level in determining whether or not it 
will continue. The machine makes its own path through the space of possible 
moves, which, while entirely unpredictable, is still completely attributable to 
specific causes. 
Overall, the process becomes an iterative, divergent search. Individual actions 
are improvisational and exploratory, eliminating any careful calculation or pre-
evaluation. Instead of trying to predict the best route through a sequence of 
unknown spaces, the machine focuses its efforts on exploring the possibilities of 
the each space as it arrives. 
*Or, at least as many as are computationally possible. In the end, the effort is not to 
create a program that considers every option – rather, it is to create a program that is 
open to the idea of exploring new possibilities simply because they’re there.
84. Bergson, Henri. 1944. 
Creative Evolution. p. 34. 
As quoted in: 
 Teal, Randall. 2010. 
“Developing a (Non-Linear) 
Practice of Design Thinking.” 
p. 296
85. Summers, David. 2003. 
Real Spaces.  p. 106
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Contributions
The question of autonomous, computationally creative machines is not a matter 
of if, but when. In light of that, this thesis attempts to further the discussion of 
how by proposing play as a necessary component of creativity, and autotelism as 
a necessary component of play.
•	 By providing a definition of play as an autotelic activity detached from 
external motivation, I have demonstrated its potential in creative endeavors.
•	 I have also used this lens to critique the trend in computation, and in 
particular artificial intelligence, toward a heterotelic, externally-motivated 
model of decision-making. 
•	 I have provided a four-part framework for computational play, stipulating the 
need for multimodal, generative, iterative, and autotelic activity. In particular, 
I have diagrammed how a computational implementation of autotelism can 
yield interesting behavior that is unpredictable yet entirely attributable. 
•	 Finally, I have provided a working implementation of a computationally 
playful drawing machine. This machine exists as a proof-of-concept of my 
framework. It is capable of demonstrating the interesting behaviors that arise 
from autotelic play and expanding the capabilities of computational creativity 
into new domains.  
Initial Drawings
The machine demonstrates a cyclical drawing process that is entirely reminiscent 
of a designer iteratively constructing a drawing. It begins with an initial shape, 
views the shape, and cycles through possible next steps based on its drawing 
rules. By overlaying footage of the digital drawing process with the physical 
one, we see the rule application process in action: after using machine vision to 
5.1 Results
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rule application:
“rotate a triangle 180 degrees around its centroid”
recognize the current geometry, the machine cycles quickly through its possible 
options, before choosing one and proceeding to the plotting stage. All three 
computational stages (embed – choose – fuse) blend into one continuous process. 
In an early drawing experiment, before the ability to erase had been added, the 
machine handily demonstrated the ability to deal with novelty. The only rule 
supplied was a triangle inscription rule visualized in Figure 5-52.
Using this, the machine demonstrated the ability to see multiple options at once 
(Figure 5-54, [1-3]), including new options that showed up in subsequent stages 
[4-6]. In an interesting twist, the machine accidentally trailed the pen across the 
drawing as it was resetting during one iteration. Unfazed, it incorporated this 
additional line into its digital interpretation of what it saw [7], and then was able 
to recognize a new triangle as a result of the accident [8]. 
After installing the erasing mechanism, the machine completed a reconstruction 
of the triangle computation described in chapter 2.1  Design + Drawing, again 
demonstrating the ability to deal with emergent values.* To recap, the drawing 
rule used is a triangle rotation rule, illustrated in Figure 5-53. 
*Of course, this begs the question “What is emergent?” when we treat every act of vision 
like a totally new beginning. The complete lack of memory means that everything is 
emergent, since there is no history to use as comparison. To use Stiny’s words in The 
Critic as Artist, “Every time I look at anything, it’s for the first time.” (p. 4)
Figure 5-52 
Drawing rule involving the inscription of a triangle in another triangle, using the 
centerpoints of the outer triangle’s sides for the vertices of the inner triangle.
Figure 5-53 
Drawing rule involving the rotation of a triangle 180 degrees around its centroid.
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Figure 5-54 
Initial drawing attempts using the rule in Figure 5-52. The machine did not have an eraser at this point. The red shape a 
post-process overlay of what the machine is considering at that moment.
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In these images (Figure 5-55), the lower red shape indicates the shape that the 
machine intends to erase (the offset is due to the physical separation between the 
pen and the eraser). The upper red shape is the shape that the machine intends 
to draw. After rotating (erasing and redrawing) the three initial triangles [1-
3], the machine recognized the emergent outer triangle, which it proceeded to 
rotate [4]. It also recognized the emergent inner triangle, which it rotated [5]. 
This provided the machine with three new triangles to rotate [6-8]. In the final 
step, the machine accidentally trailed both pen and eraser through the drawing, 
resulting in the strange-looking result shown [9].   
Figure 5-55 
Drawing sequence using the triangle rotation rule in Figure 5-53. In each image, the lower red shape is the shape to erase 
(the offset is due to the physical separation between the pen and the eraser), and the upper red shape is the shape to draw.
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Figure 5-56 
Drawing sequence using the same triangle rotation rule as in Figure 5-55. The rough application of the eraser results in 
residual lines [1-2]. The machine incorporates these residual lines and extracts new triangles to operate on [3-4].
In another run of the same drawing rule, the machine took a quite different 
approach. Due to a slight misalignment of the eraser, the machine repeatedly 
failed to fully get rid of the triangles it was trying to erase (leaving, to paraphrase 
Sutherland, dirty marks on acrylic) (Figure 5-56 [1-2]). Once again, the 
machine took these residual marks in stride. The lines resulted in additional, 
small triangles appearing in the drawing, and the machine repeatedly chose these 
accidental shapes to operate on [3-4].
1 2
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5.2 Future Work
Improvements + Modifications
The computational framework itself is meant to be applicable to a wide variety 
of implementations – not just drawing machines. While the possibilities for this 
are endless, the discussion below will focus on the modifications most relevant 
to the drawing machine described in chapter 4  Drawing Machine. 
The machine vision algorithms were custom-developed in order to maintain 
tighter control over the vision process. Implementing a library of machine vision 
components, such as OpenCV, would take the process in a slightly different 
direction, but could result in smoother, faster recognition of the drawing content. 
The drawing rules are infinitely variable. The rules could be programmed to 
be exceedingly complex or overly abstract, resulting in drawing behavior that 
would seem entirely obscure to an outside observer. In addition, any number of 
rules could be included, drastically reducing the ability of an observer to predict 
what will happen next. 
In addition, the physical plotting mechanism is an area that could see a wide 
variety of modification. The Z-axis could be outfitted with more than a pen 
and eraser – for instance, multiple colors, or pens with multiple lineweights. 
Instead of a pen, the drawing mechanism could be significantly messier, such 
as an ink or paint brush, which would almost certainly lead to more emergent 
interpretations during the machine vision stage. And finally, the overall structure 
of the plotter could be made more mobile. A machine that is able to roam freely, 
seeing and drawing as it goes, would enable the use of a much larger canvas. 
Testing Autotelism
In its current form, the machine is capable of demonstrating the four components 
of computational play outlined in chapter 3.4  Implementing Computational 
Play. Currently, however, the autotelism of the machine simply determines 
whether the process will continue or quit. The most interesting area for 
modification and development is this component. The machine may choose to 
continue against all odds, but what does it do next?
Several interesting behaviors have been mentioned as possible products of 
autotelism. For instance, if the interest level of the machine is high, but the 
number of possibilities is low, then the machine might erase certain portions of 
the drawing that it can’t understand, in order to focus on that which it can – or 
it may choose to start over entirely. The machine may continue a drawing even 
despite the lack of progress it seems to be making. And of course, if the number 
of possibilities is high but the interest level is low, then the machine may choose 
to quit.
Perhaps most interesting, however, is the possibility that the machine may 
break or change the rules to be able to recognize or create different content. In 
one possible implementation of this, the rules of the play might themselves be 
parameterized. The computer would be able to tweak the parameters that define 
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either the shape to be recognized or the transformation to be applied, resulting 
in entirely different drawing outcomes. For instance, if we parameterize the 
triangle rotation rule, as is shown in Figure 5-57, then we might suddenly be 
able to recognize pentagons instead of triangles [1], draw a triangle at a different 
angle of rotation than before [2], or even drop the erasing factor altogether and 
maintain both triangles [3].
Figure 5-57 
Rule-breaking scenario #1: Parameterizing the rules in order to recognize new shapes 
[1], change the rule’s transformative ability [2], or maintain the original content [3].
Another implementation might involve the computer swapping the left-hand 
and right-hand sides of two different rules. If the transformations involved are 
general enough, the rules could feasibly intermingle into new possibilities. In 
Figure 5-58, a triangle inscription rule and a pentagon rotation rule are swapped 
to create a triangle rotation rule and a pentagon inscription rule. 
# sides to recognize:  3rule parameters:
rule variations:
[1] # sides to recognize:  5
# degrees to rotate:  180
[2] # degrees to rotate:  90
transformation process:  erase + draw
[3] transformation process:  draw
955 Conclusion
Applications
The most immediate application of this thesis is to the field of computational 
creativity. This machine is a proof-of-concept of the proposed definition of play 
and computational play framework. It demonstrates an autonomous, playfully 
creative drawing process. The machine is meant to provoke discussion as much as 
it is meant to provide useful technical insight. As AI moves into widespread use in 
creative design environments, it must begin to employ behaviors demonstrated 
by creative designers. With enough development, such machines could one day 
be tasked with design projects of all scales, from architectural details to entire 
building designs. 
Until such a vision is realized, however, creative AI will most likely be used 
in collaborative settings. Even in collaborative design scenarios, many of the 
behavioral characteristics of play are maintained. An autonomous subject acting 
in concert with a human designer could prove to be an excellent way to study 
the system at close range. Furthermore, such a subject could provide more 
interesting and novel prompts in a designer’s software UI. Play need not be a 
high-level, all-encompassing strategy: Even non-autonomous tools (especially in 
design environments) could benefit from the implementation of play behavior.
While the thesis argues for the use of play for the advancement of 
computational creativity, a broader argument can be made for the role of 
play in artificial intelligence. The work of Der and Martius hints that play 
provides an excellent foundation for emergent self-organization.86 This work 
would necessitate additional components interacting with play: memory 
and learning, for instance. Modeling play alongside these more commonly-
understood elements of our thinking could prove instrumental in advancing 
the field of artificial intelligence.
Figure 5-58 
Rule-breaking scenario #2: Swapping the left- and right-hand sides of two rules in 
order to generate totally different rule outputs.
86. Der, Ralf, and Georg 
Martius. 2012. The Playful 
Machine.
“inscribe a triangle 
in another triangle”
“rotate a pentagon”
“rotate a triangle”
“inscribe a pentagon 
in another pentagon”
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Figure 5-59 
Play as a permeable membrane. The player is able to interact with the context outside of the play. 
While the actual play activity only occurs inside the boundary, the player can still bring new 
information into the play, and carry information out.
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5.3 Discussion
The work mentioned in 2.4  Related Work is just a small sample of the 
immense amount of research into computational creativity and creative 
machine behavior. While much of this work is quite advanced, and capable of 
generating real novelty, as Wiggins dubs it,87 the researchers tend to focus on 
the broader question of how to generate creative content - i.e., what processes 
of generation and judgment result in human-like creative output. The primary 
distinction made by this thesis is to ignore that question, instead focusing on 
the behavior of creativity, or the motivational force that drives design. This 
thesis adopts the position that while it may be possible to objectively quantify 
creative output, it is equally important to recognize the role of subjectivity in 
the creative process. The drive to create (and in turn, design) is a primal urge, 
and this thesis attempts to take a step toward realizing that behavior through 
the implementation of computational play.
Design as a Permeable Membrane
Of course, design involves more than play. Most design professions demand 
a wide range of technical and problem-solving skills, sometimes even prizing 
these over creative vision. The designer rarely works in a bubble: Though she 
may try to ignore the world in favor of her play, it is unlikely that she could 
ever truly block out the demands that pressure her from her larger context. 
Just how this larger context relates to the rule-bounded setting of play is a 
matter of open debate. One suggestion is that, while the rules of play might 
be sacrosanct to the player, they only specify what actions can be taken (and 
why), and do not exclude the possibility of knowledge of the outside world. In 
this depiction, play becomes more of a permeable membrane than a hard-and-
fast boundary. The player is able to travel in and out of play freely, bringing 
in freshly acquired contextual information and carrying out newly gained 
knowledge. In this sense, play maintains its strict separation, but the actual 
play activity occurs in more discrete intervals (Figure 5-59).   
An Appeal to Diversity
In the early phases of the research, when the machine had not yet been fitted 
with an erasing mechanism, it could only construct drawings additively. This, 
paired with the fact that the autotelic control had not been implemented, 
resulted in a short-lived drawing process. The complexity of the drawing soon 
outpaced the machine’s ability to process what it could see, leading to an empty 
possibility space. The machine couldn’t see a possible avenue, so it halted. 
This difficulty led to the insight that the motivation for our drawing process 
is affected both by the number of avenues open to us and our own internal 
desire to continue. One could argue that the machine simply needed better 
hardware, or better software, or different rules of behavior – and perhaps this 
would have improved the outcome – but designers do not always have the best 
87. Wiggins, Geraint A. 2006. 
“Searching for Computational 
Creativity.” p. 220
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tools, or total mastery of the tools they do have, or even complete knowledge 
of a particular problem. 
If the machine has succeeded in any way, it has been in the way that it has 
surprised me. Even in my pursuit of novelty, the machine acted in ways I do 
not understand. While I do not believe this was due to any sentience on the 
part of the machine, I hesitate to call the behavior a bug. Doing so simply 
reinforces the idea that the correct answer is already known. In fact, if it weren’t 
for the “mistakes” on the part of the machine, I would never have traveled the 
path that I did. This lesson sounds prosaic at first, but it is an important one 
to consider in terms of design. 
Design is difficult – especially when, as I did as a child, we establish a model 
for judging the outcome before we even make a move. In design, as in most 
creative endeavors, the ability to act must occasionally exist independent 
of external value judgment. The results of this separation can seem odd at 
first. Why keep searching when a good answer has already been found? Why 
pursue a wrong answer? Why break the rules? Instead of demanding a useful 
answer from such questions, I find it illuminating to ask a different set: What 
motivates us to proceed when we get stuck? What do we do when we confront 
something we don’t understand? How can we overcome the desire to rely upon 
answers that already exist? And finally, what opportunities will we uncover 
when we let loose our creative curiosity and pursue novelty for novelty’s sake? 
Such questions are grounded in an optimistic view of design: One that believes 
there is value in the process aside from the results, and that there is, and will 
always be, interesting things to discover. The world of design is not a fixed 
and definite place, waiting to be fully understood, properly optimized, and 
successfully predicted. It is a dynamic and diverse landscape, full of interesting 
surprises that will challenge our understandings, for the better. 
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Figure 5-60 
Drawings produced by the machine.
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